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INTRODUCTION  
arly in 2003, the Forum Group on Mortgage Credit set up by the European Commission met 
for the first time in order to take on the ambitious tasks of identifying and assessing the 
impact existing obstacles to the functioning of an Internal Market for mortgage credit and 
coming forward with concrete political recommendations on the necessary steps to aid its 
formation. 
The group’s work, which ended with the publication of its final report in late 2004, was 
followed up by a Commission Green Paper on mortgage credit in the EU, a related public hearing, 
the creation of the Government Expert Group on Mortgage Credit (GECMC), the Mortgage 
Industry and Consumer Dialogue Expert Group (MICEG), the Mortgage Funding Expert Group 
(MFEG) and the Expert Group on Credit Histories (EGCH), the publication of the respective 
reports, a White Paper on the integration of mortgage markets and a public hearing on responsible 
lending and borrowing. Several studies – on costs and benefits of integration of EU mortgage 
markets; the role and regulation of non-credit institutions in EU mortgage markets; credit 
intermediaries in the internal market; equity release schemes; consumer testing of possible new 
format and content for the European Standardised Information Sheet on home loans; and the costs 
and benefits of different policy options for mortgage credit (undisclosed) – complemented the 
Commission’s initiatives.  
It was, however, the financial crisis that had the greatest impact on the awareness of the 
interdependence of mortgage markets and of the need for a common EU-wide legal framework for 
home loans. While mortgage lending moved into the worldwide spotlight with the subprime 
lending disaster in the US, developments in several European markets served as a gentle reminder 
that loans for house purchases are not (yet) covered by EU-wide legislation – despite accounting 
for the lion’s share of the indebtedness of European households.  
The turmoil has provoked the European Commission to now – after years of consultation – 
come forward with a proposal for a Directive on credit agreements relating to residential property 
in March 2011. The Commission simultaneously published the 2008-09 study on the costs and 
benefits of different policy options for mortgage credit and its own impact assessment on the 
proposed Directive. 
The EU executive thereby confronts critics from both camps: banks and mortgage lenders, 
which oppose tougher rules and insist on waiting for the impact of the new Consumer Credit 
Directive (CCD); and consumer representatives, who fear the proposal will fall short of sufficiently 
enhancing consumer protection.  
In May 2010, CEPS and ECRI formed a Task Force in a joint effort to contribute to the debate 
on how the EU could most efficiently respond to the challenges posed and the deficiencies 
revealed by the financial crisis in the area of retail credit. Composed of a diverse group of bankers, 
industry and consumer representatives, independent experts and academics, the group met four 
times over a period of nine months. The members’ work, and this report resulting from it, closed in 
February 2011. This report therefore does not contain a full analysis of the proposal for a Directive, 
which was unknown at the time. However, as per May 2011, it has been updated by the 
rapporteurs to make cursory references to the Directive. 
The report starts with an Executive Summary, which comprises observations and general 
recommendations. It is subdivided in three chapters. Chapters 1 and 2, comparing mortgage credit 
markets in the EU and the US, and in the EU member states, serve as a background for the 
discussion in chapter 3 discussing the policy response. The first two chapters are authored by 
Achim Dübel, chapter 3 by Marc Rothemund in cooperation with Dübel.  
E  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS* 
olicy-makers have long hesitated to embark on harmonising the consumer protection regime 
in mortgage lending in the EU. This has been motivated by the strong idiosyncrasy of 
member state mortgage banking structures, their funding and lending products, and the 
housing, capital market and subsidy environments. Also, the absence of a cross-border market 
rendered an intervention politically difficult. This distanced view remained dominant even as 
member state consumer protection regimes continued to show large gaps regarding minimum 
standards, in particular in the transition countries joining the EU since 1989. 
The financial crisis starting in 2008, and the important role of mortgage loans not only in the 
subprime crisis in the United States, but also in some EU markets, has acted recently as a 
catalysing factor to change the traditional perspective. Mortgages and related asset classes, such as 
developer loans, are so large in proportion to bank assets that, as the crisis developed, the 
problems in some EU mortgage markets no longer remained confined to national boundaries. 
Rather they had EU-wide ramifications, e.g. by affecting investors in other jurisdictions funding 
banks, or by deteriorating the country’s fiscal position as a result of massive support for failing 
banks. The effort to harmonise consumer protection thus must be seen as an element of a whole set 
of financial reform measures to improve and further align banking supervision in the EU, one that 
tries to address stability problems at their root – the lender-consumer relationship. 
This report has been written, and the corresponding CEPS Working Group has been 
convened, while the Directive on credit agreements relating to residential property was being 
developed by the Commission. It therefore does not directly relate to the Directive, but rather 
analyses the consumer protection and stability issues that arose with the crisis, as well as their 
correspondence with the current status of regulation of mortgage credit in the EU. On this basis, 
the report makes a series of recommendations regarding credit distribution, underwriting and 
consumer or lender options in the ongoing concerns over the mortgage credit contract. As also 
does the proposed Directive, it leaves out the areas of contract enforcement (mortgage foreclosure) 
and consumer insolvency. 
CREDIT DISTRIBUTION 
1.  The legal framework for the provision of pre-contractual information should be improved. 
The provision of pre-contractual information has been the least-contested element of mortgage consumer 
protection. In order to improve the current legal framework, EU policy-makers should consider: 
-  Making the handing out of the European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS), currently governed by 
a self-regulatory Code of Conduct, a legal obligation. 
-  Obliging not only lenders but also credit intermediaries to provide potential borrowers with the ESIS. 
-  Introducing improvements (simplification and format) to the ESIS through a tri-party approach 
(mortgage lenders, consumer associations, public administration), considering the actual use by 
consumers. 
-  Specifying the timing of information disclosure in order to give consumers the time to consider the 
offer, coupled with the introduction of the possibility for consumers to waive the reflection period. 
 
                                                      
* The Task Force members, and the institutions to which they belong, do not necessarily subscribe to the 
recommendations presented in the Executive Summary. The main body of the report is drafted under the 
responsibility of the authors. 
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2.  Computation methods for the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) should be 
harmonised. 
A clearly understandable and EU-wide common calculation of the APRC could increase mortgage market 
transparency and product comparability, allow lenders to benefit from an improved competition 
environment and consumers from lower search costs. To this end, EU policy-makers should: 
-  Align APRC computation methods with the provisions set out in the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD). 
-  Address the narrow vs. broad APRC question by quoting total cost of credit according to the CCD 
concept and a narrow APRC, reflecting the lender-induced cost only. Given the large variety and 
national specificity of mortgage products and combinations thereof within the EU, a narrow APRC 
definition serves cross-border comparisons better than the broad CCD definition. In contrast, the broad 
CCD definition serves better to protect consumers against hidden cost surprises in the established 
national mortgage markets. The risk of consumer over-information appears limited. 
-  Introduce a combined APRC if and when different loan, or combined loan, savings or insurance, 
components are offered simultaneously to consumers. 
-  Formulate reasonable APRC assumptions, differentiated by product class, that address the 
described problems arising from interest rate fixing and adjustment mechanisms changing 
between loan phases. 
-  Rationalise the assumptions behind the APRC of variable-rate loans, quoting in addition long-
term average rates representative of the maturity horizon of the loan as opposed to simply 
extrapolating today’s variable loan rate and pre-empting quotes based on the initial discount 
rate. 
-  Reduce the maturity assumption in the APRC, however, from extremely long contractual 
maturity to expected maturity, given early repayment options. 
 
3.  The risks of providing unsuitable financial advice should be mitigated by exploring the 
possibility to unbundle the service from credit intermediation. 
The increased complexity of mortgage products, and the number of products on offer and providers on the 
supply side render the provision of financial advice to consumers critical. In light of the possible conflicts of 
interest in this area, EU policy-makers should: 
-  Refrain from making the provision of financial advice by lenders a legal requirement but instead create 
a framework for ensuring that when advice is given, it is of a recognisably high standard. 
-  Refrain from prohibiting certain forms of remuneration for credit intermediation, but rather demand 
consistency with the obligation of intermediaries to act in the customer’s best interests, which 
might include a trail arrangement. 
-  Ensure that credit intermediaries are sufficiently institutionally independent and operate under 
minimum professional standards. 
-  Address the limitations of financial education more proactively and provide financial advice to 
consumers via government-sponsored entities or programmes. This could help to reduce the strong 
reliance at present on banks and credit intermediaries regarding financial advice. 
UNDERWRITING 
4.  Affordability assessments and stress-testing should be made a legal requirement. 
An EU-wide legal requirement could improve incentives to more carefully assess borrower affordability. In 
this respect, EU policy-makers should: 
-  Introduce a legal requirement for lenders to conduct a comprehensive creditworthiness assessment 
based on stress tests regarding the specific product offered (indirect suitability assessment). Stress tests 
should measure the impact of changes in key environmental variables on the permanent fulfilment of 
reasonable underwriting criteria, given the contract parameters. For example, such tests would include, 
but not be limited to, the impact of changes in interest rates via the interest rate adjustment and 
amortisation regime of the contract on the future debt service-to-income ratio, and the impact of 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
changes in house prices via the initial loan-to-value ratio and amortisation regime of the contract on the 
future loan-to-value ratio. 
-  Introduce a legal requirement to deny credit or propose more conservative underwriting in the case of a 
negative result of the affordability assessment. Rules should be specific, e.g. differentiate between a 
‘stretched’ or predatory lending situation (individual lack of creditworthiness) and the situation of 
general house price inflation (systemic lack of creditworthiness). 
-  Encourage the use of more conservative house price valuation standards, e.g. the discounted cash flow 
method using saved rent payments, to reduce reliance in underwriting on observed prices and render 
loan-to-value rules meaningful. 
-  Extend CCD provisions of non-discriminatory (cross-border) credit database access for mortgage 
lenders, allowing for full credit data-sharing. 
-  Explore possibilities to work towards greater convergence of credit registers’ database content. 
-  Explore the possibilities to work towards an agreed minimum level of data in credit registers databases. 
-  Make available to lenders both income and non-financial services credit data in order to allow them to 
form a more comprehensive picture about the commitments and indebtedness of the consumer. 
CONTRACTUAL PHASE 
5.  The legal framework governing early repayment rights and compensation schemes should 
be addressed. 
The pre-payment option is important to safeguard financial and physical mobility of European 
consumers. Regulating the area might improve the outlook for a renaissance of the European fixed-
rate mortgage (FRM) market.  
-  The consumer should have the right to make an early repayment; rejecting a prepayment or 
charging arbitrary prices under negotiated prepayments seriously reduces consumer mobility. 
-  Lenders should be able to recover their cost in case of an early repayment. Pre-payment 
indemnities should be harmonised along the lines of the fair value approach, ideally on the basis 
of symmetric yield maintenance computations which are based on standardised benchmarks 
(‘marketing-to-market model of prepayment charges’). Harmonising indemnities is central to 
positively delimit the ‘non-callable’ FRM product, which dominates the FRM market in Europe (a 
‘callable’ FRM would be one in which no indemnity is charged). 
-  The CCD approach of a tight statutory ceiling on indemnities is not transferable to long-term 
mortgage lending. Tight caps lead to a dual pricing structure of the prepayment option as a 
spread mark-up and a residual indemnity. Contracts should be clearly structured into either 
containing a spread mark-up or an indemnity, which requires a degree of flexibility for the latter 
as described. 
-  In order to counter a potential credit risk increase, a combination of broad volume and time 
ceilings (residual interest-rate fixing period) could limit a yield maintenance indemnity 
computation formula. Examples for simple ceilings would be 10 years and 10% of the 
outstanding loan amount, or 5 years and 5%. 
-  The transparency of the indemnity component related to the loss of the lender administration, 
credit risk and profit (‘servicing’) income stream from a prepayment should be enhanced. This 
component should either match the actual cost incurred by the lender, or a simple lump-sum 
volume formulation should be used (e.g. 1% or 0.5%). 
 
6.  Rate adjustment and caps 
The European mortgage market is dominated by adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM). These exhibited 
considerable payment shock risk for consumers before and during the financial crisis. Yet, very few 
regulatory initiatives have been made at EU level for this product. The new CCD has dropped the 
requirement of using a reference index for rate adjustment and instead asks only for additional 
disclosure before such adjustment. Given the high importance for consumer protection, bank 
solvency, competition and monetary policy, the issue should be addressed. A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 5 
-  The approach taken by the CCD to create heightened transparency of an upcoming rate 
adjustment will not have major consumer protection effects in ARM lending. During a crisis, the 
options for consumers to avoid an increase by prepaying a long-term loan typically diminish, 
especially for those consumers most vulnerable to the rate increase.  
-  ARM lending in the EU – whether in the form of reviewable rate or index-tracker mortgages – 
should be brought to a minimum standard regarding large downside interest rate risk protection 
for the consumer. When lenders offer such protection, against a rate mark-up paid by consumers, 
this significantly improves the risk profile of mortgage borrowing. Markets penetrate less down 
the credit curve, house price cycles are mitigated as the discount factor for pricing the saved rent 
stream derived from ownership remains higher, and the political pressure on central banks to 
reduce interest rates in order to avoid increasing defaults, in particular during crisis, is reduced.  
-  Limiting downsize risk implies the use of sufficiently tight and long-term interest rate caps (e.g. 
x+2%, or 150%*x, over at least the first 5 years of the loan, with x being the initial rate). An 
alternative to interest rate caps are payment caps, or in the case of foreign currency, lending caps 
on a maximum permissible exchange rate (possibly combined with interest rate caps). The impact 
will be a narrowing of the cost difference between ARM and FRM; however, this does not mean a 
full equalisation, since the borrower still takes a determined, yet limited amount of interest rate 
risk. Interest rate caps can be shorter the faster loans amortise, which reduces the payment shock 
risk.  
-  Given detrimental experiences during the financial crisis in both products – reviewable and 
tracker (reference index-linked) – in the EU, the case for mandating the use of reference indices to 
govern the ARM product seems weak. This speaks in favour of accepting both types of products 
throughout the EU, provided safeguards regarding sufficiently reactive adjustment of 
reviewable-rate products are in place. 
 
7.  Dealing with more far-reaching material consumer protection issues  
The current policy approach of the European Commission with regard to retail lending focuses largely on 
recommendations regarding responsible lending. This has been criticised as a departure from the traditional 
approach of focusing on the internal market and cross-border lending. 
Yet, next to structural barriers,  material consumer protection issues in mortgage credit are also 
impediments to an integrated market and fall under the EU’s mandate as competition watchdog. Moreover, 
financial stability issues in one jurisdiction resulting from a lack or excess of consumer protection generate 
problems within the credit markets of the entire Union. While stability issues are not a formal EU mandate 
as defined in the Treaty, they clearly impair a number of functions of the EU.  
Developing products and practices in consumer lending markets as well as long delays of stakeholder 
discussion ensure that a comprehensive (maximum harmonisation) regulation approach at the EU level 
does always too little too late. In contrast, mutual recognition of more far-reaching consumer protection at 
the national level, as well as minimum harmonisation, which leaves out many relevant issues, preserves the 
patchwork of legislation, seriously impairing the cross-border market as well as financial stability.  
A more defensive approach is proposed, which structures an interaction process between member states 
and EU regarding more far-reaching consumer protection regulation along the lines of the mechanisms laid 
down for state aid. 
The core of the proposal is to enable the EU to define a methodology to estimate the risk exposures of 
consumers who purchase certain products and are exposed to certain practices, and create an appeals 
process for the member states that have stricter national material consumer protection rules. Member states 
would in particular be subjected to review their idiosyncratic rules on a frequent basis and bear the onus of 
providing empirical evidence of its rationale. 
 
  
6 | 
 
1.  MORTGAGE CREDIT MARKETS IN TRANSATLANTIC 
PERSPECTIVE 
1.1  EU and US markets compared 
The EU and the US present quite different pictures in their respective levels of household 
indebtedness. Credit to households in the US in 2009 stood at 92% of GDP, slightly below the 2007 
peak of 95%. The corresponding value for the EU 27 for 2009 was about two-thirds that of the US, 
or 65% of GDP, but it is impossible to speak of a European model. Within the EU three main 
categories can be distinguished: transition countries generally feature the lowest debt ratios of 
between 20% and 30% of GDP, with the notable exception of the Baltics (Estonia 54% of GDP, even 
higher than Latvia’s 46%); followed by a range of ‘conservative’ established markets in Central 
E u r o p e  w i t h  r a t i o s  b e t w e e n  4 0 %  a n d  6 0 %  o f  GDP (Germany 58%, France 49%). Finally, most 
peripheral and northern European retail finance markets are highly leveraged with ratios between 
80% and 140% (Ireland 79%, Spain 83%, Portugal 84%, the Netherlands 102%, UK 108% and 
Denmark 139%). In both the first and the third category – transition countries and periphery – 
household debt levels have been strongly rising in the past 15 years.1  
The basic determinant of US and European household debt levels has been a low interest rate 
environment, with low personal savings rates in the US and a more varied picture in the EU. The 
underperformance of US personal savings already started in the 1980s, when Japan and the Gulf 
states financed a large proportion of the current account deficits. A brief spell of higher US savings 
followed in the early 1990s during which German and European reunification absorbed large 
amounts of global capital flows and the Clinton administration fiscally consolidated. However, 
capital flows resumed their direction towards the US in the 2000s: this time in addition to Japan 
and the Gulf states, China and other emerging Asian markets became key creditors. The US – 
Asia/Gulf credit relations are mirrored here with the pair eurozone periphery – Germany/France. 
Intra-European lending helped to drive down the personal savings ratios in Spain and Ireland and 
other periphery countries, including important non-eurozone members. As the crisis developed, 
personal savings ratios in Spain, Ireland and other periphery countries have increased 
dramatically again while the US has adjusted more moderately (see Figure 1). 
A key feature of the household debt build-up has been an increase in the availability of 
inexpensive capital across borders in increasingly integrated global and regional capital markets. 
In certain European markets, foreign investors were tapped via the covered bond and mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) markets. This allowed banks and new non-bank competitors to continue 
with the debt build-up (and housing booms) after the domestic deposit base was depleted.2 In the 
US foreign capital was attracted via both the government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) – Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac – that had developed Treasury bond substitutes (‘agency bonds’) which 
were in high international investor demand. This semi-public channel was complemented by a 
private channel via securitisation products and their derivatives arranged and sold globally by 
Wall Street banks.  
 
                                                      
1 All data are drawn from the ECRI statistical package 2010. 
2 See Addison-Smith et al. (2009) for a quantification for Ireland. Figure 1. P
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Interest rate increases moving up payments have been announced by Irish lenders in the 
reviewable-rate portfolio; they also have attempted to generate a prepayment wave of index-
trackers, which are loss-making. The combined effect together with relaxing legal liability for 
residual debt is expected to push default rates higher. In Spain, Euribor-linked mortgage rates are 
gradually increasing; an interviewed lender comments that the room for manoeuvre for rate 
increases, before defaults are expected to increase again, is perhaps 1%. The question is therefore 
highly relevant of how much additional scope there is in Europe for house price adjustment 
because delayed foreclosures come to the market as interest rates rise going forward, or because 
the legal foreclosure regime is changed.  
1.3  Drivers of financial regulation and consumer protection 
1.3.1  United States – Breakdown of a capital market-based system 
Financial system design 
The setup of the US housing finance system bears partial responsibility for current events even 
though its core was designed in the 1930s and for a long time has been a source of relative stability. 
Then, an ill-regulated state bank and thrift system was squeezed into the corset of public liquidity 
facilities (Federal Home Loan Banks [FHLB]), insurance (Federal Housing Administration [FHA]) 
and mortgage banking (Federal National Mortgage Association [Fannie Mae]). The failure to 
abolish the New Deal’s institutions when the economy had recovered by the 1950s created a giant 
policy lag. Eighty years later, Fannie and Freddie turned out to produce some of the biggest loss-
makers in US financial history. In the meantime, the private sector was mostly assigned to the 
risky pockets of the system: private mortgage insurance in the 1950s, moving in the 1970s into 
insuring high loan-to-value [LTV] ratios, in the 1990s and 2000s into sub-prime lending funded 
mostly by securitisations, and in the 2000s home equity lending funded by banks.  
The semi-privatisation of Fannie Mae in 1968 (and the creation of Freddie Mac in 1970) 
created the major incentive problem of combining publicly supported credit and potential loss 
absorption with privatisation of profit. The birth of mortgage securitisation in 1982 goes back to 
the (ab)use of the public guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to create tradable securities 
whose fees were reaped and trading was engineered by Wall Street investment banks. The 
securitisation model culminated in the private-label (i.e. non-guaranteed) securitisation market of 
the 2000s and a proliferation of mortgage derivatives. Both public and private-label securitisation 
took place outside the regulated financial system in the ‘shadow banking system’. This is another 
long-term consequence of the 1930s in which both the FHA and Fannie Mae were created de facto 
outside the existing regulatory system to circumvent state bank and insurance regulation barriers. 
Financial deregulation 
At the peak of the housing price bubble, in 2006, both public and private US financial industries 
provided consumers with the option to finance housing with hardly any own cash savings on the 
basis of earlier capital gains and/or subsidised high LTV lending. Lax lending standards met a 
government desire to replace fiscal transfers for housing by an access to credit policy. Deregulation 
was a key instrument in this public-private partnership. 
•  US banks had been gradually deregulated in the 1970s. What was a necessity regarding 
some features, e.g. deposit rate regulations, became disastrous elsewhere: in 1971 US S&Ls 
(savings and loans) were allowed to do 95% LTV lending, against a ‘protection’ provided by 
private mortgage. This was the first of numerous holes to be dug into the formal LTV limits 
that had constrained the system of the 1930s. The regulatory big bang for subprime lending 
was the removal of interest rate usury limits in the early 1980s: rather than simply adjust 
existing loan interest rate ceilings to higher inflation levels, they were removed altogether. 
The Clinton administration enhanced disclosure requirements on the high-interest rate loans 
that developed in the aftermath, but the Reagan era liberalisation was never repealed. 12 | MORTGAGE CREDIT MARKETS IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 
•  Deregulation of the public insurance system. The FHA can be shown to have systematically 
increased its involvement in high-LTV lending – in the US context after the 1970s 
deregulations to be defined as over 95% LTV – already by the mid-1990s. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac used ‘mortgage insurance’ that turned out to be dysfunctional during the crisis 
to systematically increase their own refinancing LTVs into the 95% range; when the FHA 
withdrew from low-income housing finance in the 2000s, Fannie and Freddie purchased 
highly leveraged mortgage-backed securities and individual loans. Both massively attracted 
liquidity into the US via ‘agency bonds’, comparable e.g. to publicly guaranteed bank bonds 
issued by Landesbanken in Germany.  
•  Private label securitisation and bond insurance both followed and led the decline in lending 
standards. Apart from transparency standards and legal liability via bond indentures, the 
sector never really became regulated. Since public insurance and ‘agency’ MBS mainly 
provided fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) lending, the private sector focused on adjustable-rate 
mortgage (ARM) lending. Together with the pervasive use of short initial discount (‘teaser’) 
fixed-rate periods, this helped to inflate house prices by reducing the initial debt service of 
borrowers at the risk of future payment shock. Product innovation in the sector led to a 
‘credit multiplier’: with ‘BBB’-rated tranches packaged into mortgage derivatives and sold 
internationally, a multiple of higher-rated funding provided by foreign banks and 
institutions to the US could be realised.  Credit rating agencies, whose profits depended 
primarily on securities market volume, contributed to the credit multiplier system. The 
agencies had de facto deregulated themselves by conversion from private partnerships to 
listed companies in the 1990s; an official regulation never existed. 
In the primary market, credit intermediaries and other gatekeepers were also hardly 
regulated and often acted destructively. State codes of conduct governed the US mortgage broker 
industry, but their existence could not prevent the active role of many brokers in misdirected 
borrowers into subprime and other high-rate lending contracts. Specialised loan servicers – now 
almost all in the fold of large universal banks – arbitraged the multiple capital market funding 
exits available in the US and also often misdirected borrowers. Both external and in-house 
appraisals disregarded house price inflation and followed pointless ‘open market value’ standards 
that basically only control an individual deviation from the general (inflated) trend. 
Some of the instability, especially the large role of shadow banks, goes back to a permanence 
of unstable bank funding structures in the US. In particular long-term bank bonds have hardly 
been used in the system. This has been partly a result of the powerful role of the deposit insurer 
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) vs. bond investors and partly of the destroyed 
lending standards, in particular high-LTV lending, which enforced different funding models. 
Monetary policy in the US has the dual mandate of safeguarding price stability and supporting the 
economy, i.e. the fiscal policy side is at least partially subject to incentives to increase leverage and 
slow down de-leveraging. 
Consumer protection 
Borrower selection policies in the US were completely dominated by the capital market system set-
up, and despite rhetoric in Codes of Conduct, enabling laws and other regulations became 
corrupted. When FHA was kept from increasing their house price limits in 2003 by the Bush 
administration, the resulting gap was quickly occupied by private subprime lending. As house 
prices further inflated, ‘Alt-A’ lending by the private sector replaced direct Fannie/Freddie 
lending to prime credit. Essentially prime credit borrowers became classified as ‘Alt-A’ if they 
failed to meet one or several check boxes on Fannie/Freddie loan purchase checklists. 
Fannie/Freddie then purchased many ‘Alt-A’ bonds, i.e. de facto circumventing their own rules. 
Those bonds contained many ‘liar’ loans: house price levels, especially in the coastal regions, were 
simply too high to be fundable at correctly stated income levels, and so income quotes were 
‘adjusted’. Loan servicers were free to place almost any loan into any of the different capital market exi
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had been living in a world of permanent house price appreciation since the 1940s, i.e. taking out 
insurance in order to increase leverage was widely seen as preferable to greater savings, which 
would have meant deferring the purchase. Saving for housing purposes ranked only sixth in a set 
of eight motives for savings quoted by US households in 2010; in Germany, with a far lower 
homeownership rate, it is routinely the third most important after cash for retirement and 
precautionary savings motives. The FHA and the housing ministry HUD operated in the past 20 
years without a single savings programme for low-income borrowers.  
Risky products proliferated after the FHA withdrew from low-income housing finance and 
during the housing bubble peak, when affordability was lowest. A contributing factor to the 
increase in ARMs, which carry payment shock risk, was the expensive nature of FRM, which in the 
US, in contrast with most of Europe, carries a full prepayment option without indemnities. The 
associated reinvestment risk for lenders raises borrowing cost on a 30-year loan by somewhere 
between 70 and 100 bp. A deeply divided market was the result: borrowers who could afford the 
option systematically lowered their interest payments during the 2000s via pre-payable FRM, and 
borrowers who could not afford that product or intended to speculate on interest rates staying low 
took out ARMs. Derivatives of ARMs increased the payment shock risk further (initial discount 
rates, interest-only loans, loans with negative amortisation such as ‘option’ ARM) and penetrated 
gradually from subprime into prime markets. In particular, most second mortgages and home 
equity loans at high LTVs were ARMs.  
Clearly, against these sector trends, the traditional transparency focus of US consumer 
protection – the country had pioneered the APRC in the 1960s under the Truth in Lending Act and 
developed a detailed loan disclosure system in the 1990s – was completely inadequate. Moreover, 
responsible lending rules embedded in the State Codes of Conduct for originators were toothless. 
Clearly, material consumer protection and fiscal policy issues mattered: the excessive expansion of 
the credit curve, the replacement of savings by high-LTV lending, an unabated lending boom as 
house price-to-income ratios ballooned, the proliferation of bubble endgame products in that 
phase, and in particular risk layering. It should also be emphasised that the default incidence of 
borrower selection and products, and in particular the mispricing of the associated securities, 
became strongly overlaid by house price levels: 2006-07 are the worst lending cohorts in US 
financial history, for whatever class of lending. Finally, research by Amherst Securities shows that 
while sub-prime lending carried the highest default rates, in terms of investor protection such 
securities were less prone to mispricing by rating agencies than securities backed by prime and 
‘Alt-A’ ARM loans. 
1.3.2  Europe – A less vulnerable bank-based system? 
Financial system design 
The US housing finance system design relying on insurance found copiers in other Anglo-Saxon 
markets (Canada, Australia). However, the United Kingdom after the mortgage crisis of the 1990s 
changed course and turned from third-party to lender self-insurance. This resulted in a 
considerable decline in the LTV-financed, and paid out in greater resilience in the current crisis. 
Both in the UK and Ireland, the traditional housing finance system via building societies has seen a 
diminished role since the 1980s, vs. the rise of commercial banks. 
Housing finance in continental Europe in contrast has relied more strongly on the issuance 
of standardised bank bonds, primarily (mortgage) covered bonds by specialised banks. This 
combined the features of bank regulation and high asset quality standards required via the 
statutory definition of covered bonds. In the case of Denmark, covered bonds still today fund 
almost the entire mortgage portfolio. In Germany, Italy, Spain and France, the historic strong 
reliance on covered bonds became diminished with the deregulation of the 1970s and 1980s, which 
allowed deposit-funded commercial banks to enter housing finance. While the public sector role in 
ensuring the functioning of covered bonds was always strong, and in the French, Italian and A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 15 
Spanish markets even one of direct ownership of issuing banks, over time the covered bond 
system in Europe as a whole became largely privatised. Spain and Ireland were countries that 
modernised or adopted their covered bond framework in the 2000s in order to address a shortage 
of domestic deposits amidst the lending boom. 
Financial deregulation 
While the core differences between Anglo-Saxon and continental European systems can still be 
traced today, the advent of mortgage securitisation and banking sector deregulation has blurred 
the distinctions. Banking deregulation in Europe took place mostly in the 1980s. The UK lifted LTV 
limits on building societies and admitted commercial banks to the mortgage market; this led 
directly to the Lawson boom and a wave of high LTV lending. The median LTV ratio on new loans 
increased within only five years during the early 1980s from 70% to 90%. Loan-to-value limits in 
German mortgage banking were liberalised as well at the time: total LTVs7 ratios were allowed to 
be higher than the conservative Pfandbrief senior funding LTV limit (60%). German Bausparen, a 
contract savings scheme designed to deliver safe high-LTV mortgages, came under pressure in the 
aftermath from cyclical high-LTV lending by both Pfandbrief issuers (mortgage banks) and 
commercial banks. In Denmark, commercial banks had been willing since the 1980s to give 
personal loans to fill the gap left by the 80% LTV limit for covered bonds, leading to an implicit 
rise in total LTV. European-covered bond legislation continues to differ today regarding 
permissible senior funding LTV ratios – from 60% statutory ratios in Germany are found to be up 
to 80%. Recent EU legislation capped the senior funding LTV for covered bonds and also for the 
residential mortgage definition allowing capital relief; yet, apart from such incentives, no 
regulatory limits exist for total LTV, or borrower leverage as a whole.  
Outside the Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Spain, securitisation has played 
a minor role in Europe. In Ireland and Spain, the role of the instrument has mainly been as an 
instrument to attract private cross-border flows and later during the crisis European Central Bank 
funding. While the industry points correctly to the lower overall impairment levels of European 
MBS, largely due to the relative stability of the UK and the Netherlands, there have been incentive 
and mispricing problems. Spanish and Irish MBS were endowed with too little subordination – 
lower than AAA-rated tranches – which mismatched the increasing risk as house prices ballooned 
during the 2000s. Also, MBS have in many European markets not grown beyond the small high-
risk niches of non-performing (Italy) or high-LTV (Germany) lending. This has resulted in partial 
stigmatisation of the product. European banks generally have preferred to keep high-quality loans 
on balance sheet, in particular those using extensively covered bonds that require high asset 
quality. Finally, European MBS performance has strongly benefited from the mortgage bailout via 
low interest rates and thus cannot be compared to US MBS performance (see Figure 4). 
There is a reduced role also of public mortgage insurance in Europe vs. the US (see Error! 
Reference source not found.), with the exception of the largely unconditional public insurance 
programme of the WSW in the Netherlands. The French FGAS programme, in contrast, focuses on 
a narrow access to credit mandate. In combination with a lower incidence of mortgage interest 
deduction, which was reduced during the interest rate compression phase of the 1990s in a number 
of countries, this has moderated incentives favouring leverage.  
Funding instability of banks in Europe has been less pronounced than in the US, as 
                                                      
7 Total LTV can be defined as the amount of housing finance divided by the value of the house. It is equal to 
combined LTV (CLTV) in the case of several financings, e.g. senior plus junior. The issuance of covered 
bonds is usually restricted by a senior funding LTV, i.e. the amount of covered bonds that can be issued 
against the value of the house. In the current German system, for example, covered bond lenders are able to 
disburse any amount of total LTV while the senior funding LTV remains limited to 60%. In the Danish 
mortgage bond system, however, total LTV and senior funding LTV must be identical, 80%.  16 | MORTGAGE CREDIT MARKETS IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Funding instability of banks in Europe has been less pronounced than in the US, as 
European regulation continues to favour bank intermediation of mortgage loans. There is 
generally no absolute priority of deposits in the bankruptcy process comparable to US practices. 
As recapitalisation and restructuring practice during this crisis shows, there are de facto 
government guarantees protecting covered bonds and – arguably – also senior unsecured bank 
bonds. However, this approach has increased recent European bank bailout costs dramatically, 
and its viability depends on the national sovereign credit. Despite implicit sovereign support, 
many long-term bank bond instruments are still insufficiently used as a result of regulation 
failures allowing for large mismatches, which Basel III intends to address. McKinsey (2010) 
estimates that the top-12 European banks would need to issue €1.34 trillion in long-term bonds to 
fulfil the proposed ‘net stable funding ratio’ (NSFR) requirements. Industry resistance against the 
new ratio is therefore large. 
The role of brokers and other credit intermediaries has led to problems in Europe that vary 
from the US. Generally, brokers have a more limited distribution role, and banks are more in 
control of origination through their networks. However, in some markets, such as the UK, brokers 
have been given similar incentives to sell profitable loans and misclassify customers, which led to 
tight regulations. Markets with large broker intermediation, including recently emerging countries 
such as Poland, also tend to feature higher prepayment rates than optimal (‘churn’), to maximise 
broker revenue. As a consequence, there has been a discussion in some jurisdictions whether 
trailing broker fees, a potential disciplining element, are anti-competitive or should be encouraged 
in order to discipline brokers. Brokers are often tied in Europe by lenders in forms not directly 
visible to consumers. In some jurisdictions, such as Spain, Ireland or Poland, brokers have self-
targeted to the lower end of the credit curve not served by bank branches; in Germany, in contrast, 
primarily high income clients unwilling to do branch shopping use brokers. The most prevalent 
distortion seems to have been caused by the opportunities for brokers presented by the 
‘bankassurance’ concept: in Austria and the Netherlands, brokers have benefited from interest-
only lending backed by repayment vehicles set up by insurers. This allowed them to earn a 
commission on two contracts: loan and repayment vehicle. 
Consumer protection 
Borrower selection policies have been generally less aggressive in Europe compared to the US; 
however, the claim that there have been no subprime practices in some European market would 
be incorrect. The analogies to the US are subtle, but there. In the UK, a market with analogous 
structures existed officially as ‘non-conforming’ and was funded dominantly by securitisation 
deals. Building societies, banks and a new class of non-bank firms participated as originators and 
servicers. Lending activity, especially to previously bankrupt borrowers, according to FSA (2010), 
has been a key contributing factor to elevated mortgage defaults.8 Yet, since the standard 
delimitation of prime/subprime by scoring values – an ex-ante risk concept addressing 
vulnerability – is not available, there is no reliable definition or calibration of subprime for the UK. 
The market is certainly larger than lending to the credit-impaired, an ex-post concept describing 
already realised credit risk as opposed to the ex-ante risk expressed by scores. Other non-
conforming lending concerns activities not typically served by banks, many of which are unrelated 
to borrower credit issues.  
                                                      
8 According to FSA data provided in the CEPS/ECRI Task Force on a New Retail Credit Regime for Europe, 
credit-impaired borrowers are typically low-income households, although the bottom-two income groups 
with incomes below £10,000 are less affected. These could be retired households with small mortgages.  Table 1. In
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Netherlands, which carries large potential payment shock risk. US ARM lending at its peak in 2005 
reached 39.8% market share and the US average of the critical phase of 2003-08 was 25.9%.13 In the 
eurozone, over the same period, the market share of ARM has been 59.8%14 with limited time 
variation. In the two largest European markets, both outside the eurozone – the UK and Denmark 
– ARM is currently the predominant product. These two markets should take the European ARM 
share closer to 70%. In non-eurozone transition countries, finally, the predominant lending form is 
foreign currency lending, a variety of ARM (even if interest rates are fixed in foreign currency, 
which is rarely the case). In short, European borrowers are exposed to far greater interest rate risk 
than their US counterparts. As mentioned above, credit performance in all these markets is now 
directly dependent on the short-term interest rate policies of the European Central Bank, the Bank 
of England and in the case of some transition countries, the Swiss National Bank. 
The ARM product, and in particular index trackers, had passed the declining interest rate 
environment prevailing from 1990-2005 through to consumers fastest of all products. As a result, 
the most dynamic European markets in that period have been the ARM-dominated mortgage 
markets (see Figure 5, upper right-hand side, for a BIS analysis). IMF (2011) runs a full regression 
analysis regarding determinants of mortgage market growth and confirms this role. A number of 
the particularly fast-growing periphery markets used to be FRM markets still in the 1980s and 
turned to become ARM markets in the 1990s, most notably Italy, Spain and Greece. The first 
structural factor here has been deregulation: for example, the French-style centralised mortgage 
lenders in Spain (Argentaria) and in Greece (National Bank of Greece) were quasi-monopolists and 
exclusively offered FRMs until the 1980s. With the liberalisation of the 1980s, they encountered 
competition from commercial banks, which, in the absence of long-term funding instruments – 
covered bond issuance was often a monopoly of the mortgage banks – lobbied strongly for the use 
of ARM. Consequently, legislation was changed to enable ARM: in 1994 Spain implemented a 
sweeping reform to define five indices for index-trackers. The deregulation factor was later 
overlaid by the dynamics of house price inflation: at swiftly increasing house price levels, 
affordability of traditional fixed-rate lending, which requires paying an additional price to 
investors for interest rate risk protection, was no longer given. This created bizarre situations: in 
the early 2000s, Spanish commercial banks ran out of deposits and issued and started selling fixed-
rate covered bonds to international investors, only to swap them back to match the cash flows of 
the adjustable-rate products in ‘demand’ by consumers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
13 This figure is derived by dividing the cumulative sum of new ARM single-family home lending of GSE 
and private-label securitisation sectors 2001-08 through the cumulative sum of total single-family home 
lending of both sectors 2001-08. Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
14 The figure refers to lending with an initial interest rate fixation period of equal to or under 5 years as 
ARM. Computation method as in footnote 13 for the US. Taking a 5-year initial interest rate fixation period 
cutting point as the definition is a compromise between the US approach (only interest rate fixation over the 
entire maturity of the loan considered as FRM) and the predominant European practice (all initial interest 
fixation > 1 year referred to as FRM). Source: ECB.  Figure 7. M
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court legislation now enforces a swift pass-through of falling interest rates by the lender to the 
consumer even in the case of a reviewable-rate contract, turning it essentially into an index tracker. 
Denmark remains an exception to the new index world: lenders re-auction the ARM-backed 
covered bond portfolio once a year, in December, to find the new capital market rate for the next 
year. The pervasive use of trackers has swiftly decreased borrowing cost in the interest rate 
compression trend of the 2000s. It symmetrically has also increased the susceptibility to shocks, as 
tracker interest rates are empirically far more volatile than the rates reviewed by lenders (see 
Figure 15 in chapter 3 with the UK example). Most critically, index trackers are putting central 
banks into a strait jacket as they remove all options for the banking system to alter spreads and 
increase pressure on central banks to directly manage both bank balance sheets and household 
cash flows under stress.  
As a result of balance sheet stress, in Ireland lenders in the aftermath of the crisis try to 
reclaim pricing power by converting trackers into reviewable rate loans through prepayments. 
This predictably meets resistance from existing borrowers who demand debt reduction. New 
index tracker lending has ceased in Ireland and become significantly reduced in the UK; however 
it remains the workhorse of mortgage markets in Southern Europe. Still, reviewable-rate ARMs 
come with their own set of consumer protection problems. The classic consumer group critique is 
sluggish downward adjustment when benchmark rates fall; given the negative implications of too 
fast interest rate compression for house price inflation, this is debatable. More problematic has 
been the lack of transparency and risk amnesia generated by the comprehensive use of low 
introductory fixed ‘teaser’ rates. This practice continues to be widespread in the UK, and to a 
lesser degree in Ireland. Low introductory rates remove pressure from the bank to quote the 
consumer the relevant reviewable ARM rate already upon contract closure. They also create the 
problem known from US subprime loans that consumers are underwritten, effectively, on the 
introductory rather than the permanent rate. UK regulators historically have justified initial 
discount rates as pro-competitive, but a discussion is going on whether this is not outweighed by 
the problems described. US regulators have essentially banned introductory rates now, and 
demand underwriting on a permanent interest rate basis.  
Foreign currency credit in Central European transition countries emerged because of the 
absence of a viable local currency alternative, or simply a borrower choosing between a ‘more 
expensive’ local currency and ‘less expensive’ foreign currency loan. Loans indexed in a foreign 
c u r r e n c y  i m p l y  n e g a t i v e  a m o r t i s a t i o n  r i s k  o f  the outstanding amount measured in the local 
currency. This means, in combination with using short-term interest rates in the foreign currency, 
that the product carries some of the highest payment shock risk. The outcome may be hard to 
predict. In Poland the interest rate in CHF-denominated loans was tied to the Swiss National Bank 
rate, i.e. the increasing loan balance in local currency was compensated for by declining interest 
payments in foreign currency. In Hungary, foreign currency rates were reviewable by lender, and 
by not adjusting them downward – a step taken in response to rising CHF funding cost during the 
crisis – they created an interest rate shock for borrowers with subsequent elevated default rates. 
Transition countries within the EU have reacted quite differentially as we will discuss in chapter 2.  
Often, European markets converge to a single product (class) dominating the market. The 
UK at the peak in 2006 boasted some 650 different product types; however, essentially all of these 
were adjustable-rate products matching the funding base of commercial banks. Figure 7 shows the 
examples of Germany vs. Spain with predominant FRM vs. ARM markets and hardly any 
movement of market share of these, despite comparable yield curve incentives inside the 
eurozone. The comparison of both countries suggests a strong relevance of liquidity in the 
dominant product: an FRM is systematically less expensive than an ARM in Germany, and the 
situation is the reverse in Spain. Whether supply or demand effects are responsible for the result is 
a matter of discussion. However, the legal and regulatory regime in the member states often 
further prioritises locally dominant products. Germany, for example, outlaws ARM prepayment 
indemnities (limited market share) while permitting relatively large FRM prepayment indemnities A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 23 
(main market), including an element for lost servicing income. Spain for a long time tightly capped 
FRM prepayment penalties (limited market share), while permitting 1% prepayment penalty on 
ARM (main market). Spain, already in 2007, in reaction to the interest rate shock affecting ARMs 
(see Figure 4), reformed its prepayment penalty regime in order to correct the legal bias and 
stimulate a greater FRM lending share.15 The mortgage bailout, which led again to record-low 
ARM interest rates, has rendered this effort unsuccessful so far. 
As in the US, product transparency standards in Europe have had a limited impact in 
countries seeing currently elevated default rates. The US APRC model (1968 Truth in Lending 
Act) has been copied in Europe almost everywhere, outside a few transition countries. Its most 
significant problem is that it is not consistently applied to different product classes warranting 
different APRC calculation assumptions, as will be further detailed in chapter 3. For example, a 
fixed-to-float contract (i.e. fixed initial discount rate followed by reviewable-rate ARM) warrants 
numerous assumptions to render an APRC calculation and comparison meaningful and some 
parameters are unknown at contract closing. Contracts with differing expected maturities, 
considering the prepayment behaviour of consumers, e.g. due to different formulations of the 
prepayment option regime, require different maturity assumptions.  
Other discussed consumer protection standards may have had greater relevance, e.g. the 
early repayment regime that crucially determines the supply conditions for FRM. As in the US, 
Denmark has seen a strong movement in market share from costly pre-payable FRM towards 
ARM as house prices inflated. The ‘mezzanine’ cost product non-callable FRM (5-10 years)16 
practiced in Germany, Austria or Canada is missing here as well as in a number of other countries 
that heavily use the ARM, partly due to legal intervention into prepayment indemnities. The non-
callable FRM product can be more easily priced over same-maturity government bonds, which are 
generally non-callable too, than the callable FRM, and will be less expensive. This is bought by 
some moderately higher risk for consumers, especially when the loan must be rolled over into a 
new interest-rate fixing period. The early repayment regime has also been handled particularly 
restrictively in emerging European mortgage markets, e.g. in the Czech Republic. Typically, early 
repayment options are closely correlated with consumer satisfaction levels, as consumers tend to 
value financial flexibility highly.  
As important as the subject is, the regulation of FRMs cannot be separated from regulating 
ARMs, if the goal is to arrive at a product menu conveying lower house price and credit risk. For 
instance, capped ARMs will provide greater interest rate risk protection at somewhat higher cost 
for the borrower, further narrowing the cost difference with FRMs. We discuss the issue of rate 
adjustment and caps in more detail in chapter 3, and note here that countries with a high share of 
FRMs will also be those more likely to offer caps as a protection against interest rate risk on ARMs 
(see Figure 8). 
                                                      
15 See Dübel et al. (2009, Chapter 8.2) for a discussion of the legal baseline in the EU for early repayment. 
16 For a discussion of product classification and terminology, see chapter 3. 24 | MORTGA
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In some European markets, similar policy and loan product menu distortions as in the US 
have strongly encouraged high leverage: in the Netherlands, a combination of public mortgage 
insurance with tax deductions for both mortgage interest and repayment vehicles has led to a 
strong market penetration of interest-only mortgages and median underwriting LTVs near 100%. 
Leverage has also been extremely high in Denmark, where interest tax deductions and income tax 
rates have been high historically. Germany has a parallel in the market for loans for investment 
purposes, where interest rates are deductible against taxing rental income; in fact, typically 
middle-income households become owners of a rented-out apartment before they become 
homeowners. Table 2 highlights the mixed picture regarding tax and guarantee practices. The 
implications for both household leverage and savings ratios in these countries can be traced in 
Figure 1. 
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2.  THE POLICY RESPONSE SO FAR 
2.1  Are finance and housing markets self-correcting?  
We have seen that both the United States and a large group of European countries have embarked 
upon an access-to-credit policy to replace housing subsidies/transfers and take advantage of the 
secular interest rate compression trend that has developed since the 1980s. Together with banking 
sector deregulation and the development of an unregulated shadow-banking system, this strategy 
has increased household leverage to historic levels. It has led to overbuilding and in some cases – 
most notably the US, Spain and Ireland, but also in others – to a structurally manifested bias of the 
affected economies towards the construction and financial sectors. At the peak of house price 
inflation in these economies, this strategy has generated a highly risky menu of financial products 
delivered to increasingly vulnerable consumers; a system of risk layering that is bound to fail. The 
result has been a protracted financial crisis in the US and parts of Europe, leading later on to fiscal 
crisis. 
We have also seen that both capital-market and bank-based systems can run into house price 
inflation and financial crisis when no safeguards against increasing leverage are implemented, and 
the current account remains in imbalance, reflecting large capital imports. Countries that have had 
regulation or market practices limiting leverage – notably Germany and France – seem to have 
fared better on the whole. However, deregulation has been a universal trend not limited to crisis 
countries, and the banking systems in the capital exporting countries have been co-responsible for 
creating the leverage/lending problem in the importing ones. The question of responsibility for the 
surge of capital exports – whether conservative credit policies and thriftiness, or structural 
deficiencies in demand making local investment unprofitable – is an open one. 
In an ideal world, real estate and banking sectors would clear the problems out through a 
wave of insolvencies, the target economies would suffer from major credit crunch in the sector and 
the remaining lenders would adopt more conservative policies, without much regulatory pressure. 
This is broadly the history of the UK banking system in the aftermath of the 1990s crisis.  
During the 1990s, some 5% of the UK home borrower population were repossessed and lost 
their homes. New lending conditions significantly tightened. At the peak of the UK house price 
cycle in 1989, median underwriting LTV stood at 85% with many lenders going beyond 100%, e.g. 
some 25% of new building society lending.18 With the subsequent collapse of house prices and 
rising defaults, in particular of high-LTV loans to right-to-buy tenants, the British mortgage 
insurance industry was completely wiped out. The building societies that had difficulty in 
recapitalising faced a secular decline in market share. Universal banks essentially took over the 
system, and started to self-insure against high-LTV risk. Clearly, some learning effect on the part 
of the industry can be discerned: after a short-term increase in LTVs in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis resulting from falling house prices, LTV dropped back to almost pre-liberalisation levels 
(of the 1980s) during the late 1990s. Even in the 2000s, characterised by strong house price 
inflation, LTV remained conservative compared to the 1980s.19 Major UK regulation reform was 
                                                      
18 See Dübel & Pfeiffer (1994). 
19 However, a drawback of lender self-insurance in the UK has been less crisis resilience in some corners: 
during the current mortgage market crisis, certainly milder for the UK than its predecessor as a result also of 
lower borrower leverage, the high-LTV market simply collapsed. A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 29 
only implemented in 2004 (‘M-Day’); the preceding decade was characterised by industry self-
adjustment and the search for joint minimum consumer protection standards (via establishing new 
insurance products and a code of conduct). 
Yet, tolerance for household and in particular bank insolvency runs low both in the US and 
the EU during the current financial crisis, and so does tolerance for major economic adjustment 
through rapid borrower and bank deleveraging. In the 1990s, the UK, together with Sweden, was 
an outlier regarding high levels of household debt, and financial crises elsewhere in Europe were 
limited to isolated cases and sectors (e.g. French commercial property lending). Going forward, in 
the current European situation a high level of public intervention remains likely. This puts the 
quality of public sector management under the spotlight: 
•  As the crisis has incentivised bank mergers and an exit of parts of the specialised mortgage 
industry, both American and European household lending is now dominated by large, too-
big-to-fail banks. In many cases, these banks were rescued by taxpayers with even capital 
owners being only partially wiped out. The system of national banking champions has, if 
anything, become more important in Europe, giving rise to a new type of cross-border 
market with member state sovereign credit determining future household loan market 
shares and interest rates. While the cross-border market has been cut back as the immediate 
fallout of the crisis, national champions intermediating excess savings may generate a new 
wave of capital exports sponsoring individual boom countries. Regulation efforts will have 
to be massively stepped up to control the ensuing moral hazard as well as the structural 
information opacity of ever larger banks. Both pose increasing systemic and fiscal risks.  
•  In the short term, high-leverage consumer lending needs to be continued for the sake of 
slowing down the deleveraging of households and supporting the economy. Clearly, there is 
risk that short-term solutions keeping leverage high will remain in place in the long term, as 
in the case of the US New Deal of the 1930s, whose institutions survived for 80 years before 
they collapsed. The euro crisis has created mutual support mechanisms that are tantamount 
to New Deal policies for the eurozone: state public budgets are guaranteeing banks and their 
household debt portfolios, and those state budgets in return are guaranteed by a developing 
supra-state budget. 
These trends imply a strong role of public sector as a household credit market player for at 
least the next 3-5 years in Europe. Financial reform therefore will mean not just regulating the 
private sector, but also improving public sector governance and carefully designing potential exit 
strategies. 
2.2  Current financial regulation reform discussion  
The United States first reacted to the financial crisis by issuing a number of emergency regulations 
and actions to be implemented by the public insurance system. Particularly influential for the 
correction of lending standards was the 2007 Interagency Guidance on Sub-prime Lending. It 
established, inter alia, the requirement to underwrite consumers based on fully-indexed-fully-
amortising loan characteristics, rather than initial discount rates and interest-only conditions, and 
banned prepayment penalties for high-interest rate loans. While there has been no general 
consensus on universal LTV limits, the public insurance system has reacted – for many 
prematurely, given the stage of the credit cycle - by re-tightening LTV limits: Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac increased loan purchase discounts for higher LTV lending as well as guarantee fees 
by the end of 2008, and the FHA in 2009 introduced ‘risk-based pricing’ for higher-LTV lending. 
The FHA nevertheless managed to refinance, de facto – given its earlier loss in market share - 
recapture, a large share of the sub-prime market, and also, via far higher lending limits, 
substantially expanded her insurance universe into the middle-income market. Fannie and Freddie 
have been criticised recently for discouraging prepayments by their tightening policies, thus 30 | THE POLICY RESPONSE SO FAR 
forcing consumers to keep paying high interest rates.20 As a comparison: the typical US mortgage 
borrower pays 5-6%, the typical Irish or Spanish borrower 2-3% interest (see Figure 4). The issue of 
‘streamlined refinancing’, i.e. allowing higher levels of prepayments to interest rates nearer to 
Fannie and Freddie funding levels has become more pressing as US house prices started to fall 
again in 2011. 
The main wider financial reform proposal is the 2010 Dodd-Frank bill. Central to consumer 
finance is the reference to “skin in the game”, i.e. risk retention by the securitisation industry. 
Lenders are required to hold at least a 5% stake in the asset-backed debt they structure and sell.21 
Regulators will have flexibility to tailor risk-retention rules to specific products. Credit risk 
retained by lenders may not be hedged. Importantly, 5% will not be a first loss piece, but rather a 
‘vertical slice’ that will have meaningful accounting implications. 
The hopes are that exemptions from ‘skin in the game’ rules applying to ‘qualified 
residential mortgages’ will help to create a new standard for private sector lending. Federal 
regulators will jointly define the substance of the term; as of early 2011 a limitation to 80% LTV 
mortgages is under debate. Outside the technical purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
for loans not carrying private mortgage insurance, which did not pre-empt high-LTV lending, 
there has so far been no national agreement in the US on where LTV limits could be. An April 2011 
Federal Reserve rulemaking proposal calling for tighter LTV limits is likely to meet resistance, 
given declining house prices. In contrast – as documented in historic national regulation - in most 
European states and implied by EU legislation regarding covered bonds and capital requirements, 
there are LTV limits. Also, the US FHA that runs explicit high-LTV guarantee programs, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as other agencies or government guarantee schemes, are exempt 
from the Dodd-Frank bill. This is unlikely to increase the willingness of the private financial 
industry to agree on specific terms. Finally, there are no LTV limits in the proposed new legislation 
on covered bonds, a funding tool that should gain in relevance in the US over securitisation in the 
near future. 
 
Table 3. Mortgage policy response synopsis, United States vs. European Union, 2007 - early 2011 
(p) proposal or  
working document 
European Union  EU Member states 
(selection) 
United States 
Legislation, general  Financial reform directives 
(CRD IV, deposit insurance, 
bank resolution (p)) 
Directive on credit agreements 
relating to residential property 
(p) 
  Dodd-Frank financial reform law 
(2010) 
Various interagency guidelines 
on mortgage lending standards. 
 
Legislation, Transparency  ESIS, APRC (in Directive, p)    Increased high-risk and high-cost 
product disclosure 
Legislation, Underwriting  Responsible lending rules, focus 
on credit assessment, regulation 
of credit intermediaries, waiting 
period (in Directive, p). 
UK: ban of low-
documentation loans (p) 
UK: standards for whole loan 
residential portfolio 
purchase by Bank of 
England.  
Responsible lending rules. 
Penalties for irresponsible 
lending. 
Exemptions from skin in the 
game for high-quality residential 
mortgages (QRM). 
Fed paper with specific QRM 
proposal, esp. related to LTV (p). 
 
                                                      
20 See DeRitis & Zandi (2010), who identify Fannie/Freddie, the Federal Reserve and depository institutions 
(banks) as key stakeholders standing to lose from higher prepayments. 
21 The 5% retention for securitisation was also enacted in Europe in an amendment to the Capital 
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Legislation, 
Products 
Early repayment and rate 
adjustment rules (in Directive, 
p) 
Product suitability criteria tb 
laid down by Commission (in 
Directive, p) 
Austria: CHF product ban 
Hungary: foreign currency 
product ban (earlier: LTV 
limits, differentiated by 
currency) 
 
Fed QRM specification (p). 
Prohibition of certain 
prepayment penalties (Dodd-
Frank) 
Mandatory variable rate caps 
(Dodd-Frank). 
Legislation,  
Securitisation 
/funding 
Bank insolvency reform (p) 
Skin in the game rules for 
securitisation (CRD IV, p) 
ECB ABS initiative. 
UK, Germany, Ireland – bank 
insolvency reform 
UK: Bank of England 
eligibility req for ABS and 
cov bonds 
Bank insolvency reform. 
Skin in the game rules for 
securitisation. 
Covered bond legislation (p). 
Foreclosure prevention  Empirical review of member 
state practices.  
Ireland: foreclosure 
moratorium 
Spain: short sale legislation 
(dacion en pago) 
De-facto foreclosure moratoria by 
public insurers and in the private 
sector (absence of 
documentation) 
Proposed new institutions  European Banking 
Administration (EBA). 
  Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau. 
Office of Housing Counselling. 
Existing institutions 
reforms 
  UK, Germany : restructuring 
of financial regulator system  
 
Restructuring of financial 
regulator system. 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac (public 
guarantor) reforms (p) 
Ad-hoc fiscal support    Ireland: mortgage interest 
subsidy 
Various member state 
support programs for 
unemployed / young 
homeowners (e.g. France, 
Spain) 
First-time buyer support, home 
loan modification (HAMP). 
Fiscal policy reforms  Eurozone rescue fund (EFSF) 
and stability mechanism (ESM), 
Eurobond issuance (p) 
Netherlands: restrictions on 
mortgage interest deduction 
Reduction of mortgage interest 
deduction and public guarantee 
system (p). 
 
There are numerous responsible lending rules in Dodd-Frank, an area that so far has been 
unregulated or dealt with in state codes of conduct. Lenders must ensure that borrowers can repay 
the loans they are sold. Incentives that encourage lenders to steer borrowers into more costly loans 
are prohibited. Many forms of prepayment indemnities will become prohibited. The bill also 
establishes penalties for lending considered as irresponsible. It generally expands the protection 
for high-cost mortgages and requires additional disclosures, including about the maximum a 
consumer could pay on an ARM (i.e. de-facto a statutory cap). Yet, regarding disclosure, also a de 
facto counter proposal has been made with the aim of arriving at a simplified mortgage disclosure 
form, comparable to the ESIS practised in the EU.  
On the institution-building side, Dodd-Frank establishes the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau under the Federal Reserve System in order to create a vested policy interest in consumer 
protection. An Office of Housing Counselling is established within the housing ministry HUD. 
The European Union naturally faces greater difficulty in developing and agreeing on a 
consumer finance reform proposal, due to its construction, but also to the widespread notion of a 
substantially different nature of the financial crisis. Numerous failures characterise the historical 
efforts to transpose even the limited canon of the Consumer Credit Directive to mortgage lending. 
Particularly controversial has been any rule in the ‘material’ consumer protection context: 
minimum withdrawal period, early repayment right and indemnities, interest rate adjustment 
rules, and loan assignment (securitisation). Both the Forum Group of 2005 and the Mortgage 
Funding Expert Group of 2006 failed to produce agreement among stakeholders.  32 | THE POLICY RESPONSE SO FAR 
At first the financial crisis brought the stagnating EU mortgage reform discussion process 
almost to a halt, even though mortgages in some jurisdictions were at the heart of the European 
banking and later sovereign crisis. The European Commission’s White Paper of July 201022 was the 
first official piece of dedicated crisis response: yet, it did not touch on any material consumer 
protection issues, as for example would be implied by proposing to transpose – mutatis mutandis – 
the CCD. Within the more tangible areas regarding transparency requirements, the paper 
proposed to render the use of the personalised European Single Information Sheet obligatory, 
including a 10-day waiting period before contract closure, and introducing a ‘broad’ version of the 
APRC, i.e. referring to the total cost of credit. A set of covenant rules were proposed in order to 
promote responsible lending practices on the EU level. Central is the intent to transfer existing 
bank regulation requirements for a creditworthiness assessment into the ambit of consumer 
protection and expand it with the concept of ‘suitability’. Consumers insisting, despite the lack of 
suitability of a given product, on signing a contract should be given a ‘warning’ by the lender. 
‘Advice’ is defined as a service separate from lending, i.e. non-obligatory for lenders. Credit 
intermediaries, the most likely providers of advice, are asked to get authorised, registered and 
supervised. Intermediaries shall disclose to consumers their commissions, and whether they are 
tied to a lender. Consumers have certain information duties to lenders in order to facilitate credit 
assessments.  
By March 2011 the Commission had proposed a “Directive on credit agreements relating to 
residential property” on the basis of the White Paper. The Directive clarifies the legal quality of 
transparency and responsible lending rules proposed in the White Paper; however, many 
formulations are less specific than before - for example the 10-day waiting period before contract 
closure – disappeared in favour of subsidiarity. The Commission proposes the specification of 
certain criteria, including in material consumer protection areas such as credit assessment and 
product suitability. Such criteria could potentially have a significant market regulation impact. Yet, 
the Directive is devoid of any specific wording regarding these issues, such as loan-to-value or 
loan amortisation principles, and the wording adopted in the areas of early repayment and rate 
adjustment is unrestrictive (see discussion in Chapter 3). 
While the EU has copied some of the US securitisation regulation approaches, especially the 
‘skin in the game’ idea, no explicit linkage between the quality of mortgage lending and 
securitisation has been proposed. Such linkages have been present in national covered bond 
legislations and some emergency activity (e.g. a proposed UK MBS guarantee programme in 2008). 
However, any notion of a legislated EU standard is elusive given the 30 years of fruitless 
discussion of an EU Covered Bond Directive and vastly differing member state laws and sovereign 
credit support structures. For example, excess collateral going with bondholders in case of 
insolvency may differ from virtually none (Denmark) to some 70-100% (Spain) of the outstanding 
bonds. The ECB, which has completed a €60 billion emergency purchase programme of covered 
bonds between July 2009 and June 2010 had called for a reduction of such national idiosyncracy. 
By early 2011, given plans for haircuts on unsecured bank lenders, covered bonds have gained so 
much in relevance for mortgage lenders that progress seems unlikely. 
Member states have also taken or are planning domestic regulatory initiatives. Given the 
slow progress on the EU level, the prospect of a further scattering of consumer protection 
legislation is rising. In early 2010, before the detailed default analysis had come out and even 
though it would seem that UK practices had been far less problematic than in the US, the British 
FSA suggested a ban of low-documentation loans. It would seem that in the meantime efforts are 
being made to disentangle the valid core of the product - e.g. for self-employed people facing long 
delays in formalised income documentation via tax files- from its abuse as one of many risk layers 
during the house price boom. Similarly, regulators in Latvia, Austria, Hungary and Poland have 
                                                      
22 Commission Services Working Document: Responsible Lending and Borrowing, 22.7.2010. A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 33 
been struggling in very diverse ways with the perceived or materialised risk of foreign currency 
lending. Austria has essentially banned CHF lending except for consumers with matching CHF 
incomes. Hungary has shifted between imposing severe LTV limits and a ban, Poland has 
tightened stress testing and Latvia has done nothing to curtail EUR lending, despite the non-zero 
probability of a breakdown of the currency board. The EU has withdrawn a regulatory initiative 
calling for stiff capital requirements on foreign currency mortgages in early 2010 and the issue is 
not part of the proposed Directive.23  
Capital requirements and liquidity standards are subject to review under the heading of 
Basel III. The outcome is still unclear, but might in particular change the environment for 
mortgage credit. The Basel Committee has proposed a ‘Net Stable Funding Ratio’ forcing lenders 
to fund long-term loans with long-term liabilities only. While the long-term definition includes 
almost all deposits of a lender, it rules out the use of some short-term bond and repo instruments. 
It could thus strengthen the use of covered bonds, for which at least some national regulations 
have formulated high asset quality standards. With a combined consumer (mortgage), bank and 
sovereign debt crisis on hand, the concept of ‘risk-based’ capital requirements for debt of these 
counterparties has come under intensive discussion, too. A tangible output in Basel III in this vein 
so far has been the leverage ratio, which will indirectly put a floor under capital requirements for 
both sovereign and mortgage debt held by banks. It should be recalled that the risk-weighting for 
residential mortgage loans under the standardised approach in Basel II was 35% of 8%, i.e. a 
capital requirement of 2.8%. A leverage ratio limit of 30 would lift that requirement indirectly to 
3.3%, and also limit options to arrive at lower capital ratios via the internal risk-based approach. 
The Financial Stability Board (2011) has finally set up a working party looking into mortgage 
underwriting standards. Preliminary findings encourage greater use of LTV and debt service limits 
and suggest a critical review of the capital support quality of third-party mortgage insurance.  
2.3  Current fiscal (and monetary) policy actions 
Emergency fiscal and monetary policy actions have been the priority in addressing the household 
debt crisis in the affected jurisdictions. The general thrust has been twofold: to reduce the carry 
cost of high household debt levels by reducing interest rates payable, and – so far with far lesser 
intensity - to reduce debt levels themselves.  
In the US the HAMP (loan modification) and HARP (loan prepayment) programs have 
largely been seen as failures, because insufficient pressure has been put on either the banks or 
public insurers to accept haircuts and relax their underwriting conditions for refinancing.24 
Obviously, the long-term need to arrive at a more conservative system and restore corporate 
profitability, and short-term emergency policy considerations, are in conflict. More specifically, the 
US government is interested simultaneously in short-term solutions reducing the burden for 
consumers and in retaining the solvency of Fannie/Freddie and the banks that it supports. This 
conflicted constellation has been a decisive factor in the massive purchase programs of mortgage 
securities by the Federal Reserve remaining largely ineffective in reducing mortgage rates. As of 
early 2011 house prices are falling further. 
What seems to have worked in the US is the extensive refinancing and guarantee expansion 
program provided by the FHA. Other elements of the housing policy menu are under review, 
with the priorities of reducing or eliminating mortgage interest deduction, reviewing the capital 
gains tax regime and supporting rental housing. In February 2011, the US Treasury and housing 
ministry HUD published a broad housing finance reform strategy, focusing mostly on the future of 
public guarantees. It is unlikely, given the high fiscal cost of emergency action, that new housing 
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policy initiatives will enjoy major fiscal support. In fact even the design of the public insurance 
system is unlikely to change fundamentally, given the perceived emergency situation. This puts 
the spotlight on a restructuring of tax incentives and a gradual deleveraging by tightening 
insurance conditions. 
European households pay far lower mortgage interest rates than US borrowers via the 
predominant ARM, and in particular index tracker, regime. Thus the credit loosening tactics of 
central banks in Europe have been more effective and foreclosures were kept lower than in the US. 
While refinancing has come to a halt in the UK, Spain or Ireland, too, the carry costs of the 
portfolio remain low – for both lenders and borrowers. The paying agents are savers deprived of 
returns and governments supporting far-too-low spreads in the banking portfolios with capital 
subsidies and guarantees. In Hungary, the government has been asking banks to moderate their 
reviewable CHF interest rates to reduce defaults. National foreclosure prevention programmes 
assisting certain homeowners exist in France, Spain, the UK, and Ireland. Their main focus is to 
assist unemployed and young households. In the Irish case of ‘Mortgage Interest Support’, they 
further reduce effective interest rate payments, following the successful UK model of Mortgage 
Interest Direct of the 1990s. 
Europe has so far done very little to address the structural over-indebtedness situation of 
many households, however. This is particularly relevant in the eurozone periphery where incomes 
are falling and the economic outlook is shaky. There are plans for legislation reducing the residual 
debt due from households in Ireland in case of a shortfall after foreclosure, by shortening the 
discharge period from the current twelve to six years. The threat of high levels of residual debt to 
be borne by young households has been a central motive behind the current Irish foreclosure 
moratorium. Spain is still resisting legal reform: households there are currently liable for residual 
debt for the rest of their lives. Reform might become unavoidable when the European Central 
Bank increases interest rates and house prices adjust further. The current voluntary legal option of 
repossession (‘dacion en pago’) does not seem to be widely used by banks. First court judgments 
are denying banks a residual debt claim. A political initiative in hard-hit Latvia has tried to push in 
the same direction. Also, no EU member state seems to have started a comprehensive household 
debt restructuring programme along the lines of US HAMP. When European central banks are 
forced to increase interest rates due to inflationary pressure, the subject could finally be back on 
the European agenda. 
2.4  Assessment 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the household debt crisis has led to a flurry of regulatory and fiscal 
activity, as well as the relaxation of monetary policy. The main immediate thrust of fiscal policy 
can be identified as ‘kick the can’, i.e. avoid household debt restructuring and avoid an accelerated 
cleaning out of the banking system that holds the household debt, by keeping interest rates low for 
an extended period. Some of the delay in European house price adjustment in the eurozone 
periphery, but also in the UK or Denmark, must be seen as an artefact of a strategy relying 
primarily on monetary policy. Clearly, the common denominator is fear of a deepening of the 
European banking crisis and, via the legally questionable assumption of bank debt, of the 
sovereign debt crisis of some European states. 
This approach is limited, however, by simple economics: interest rates cannot be kept below 
levels suitable to contain inflation for the sake of supporting the most affected jurisdictions for a 
longer time without risking the stagflation scenario of the 1970s for Europe as a whole. Such a 
scenario might reduce debt and its carry cost via inflation, but it would also destroy investment 
and real growth dynamics, and possibly hurt sovereign budgets even more. Therefore, some real 
reduction of household debt in the most affected jurisdictions is paramount, as is the 
engineering of a soft landing regarding debt levels in others. This will necessarily imply a rising 
number of home loan modifications and household insolvencies, and by implication further bank 
debt and potentially sovereign debt restructuring. The view that over-indebted homeowners will A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 35 
never default, regardless of how far their mortgages are under water, is deeply rooted in Europe. 
This confidence is highly likely to prove to be misplaced, as is already suggested by current US 
default trends.25 Similarly with the view that the house price peaks of 2006/7 will be reached again 
soon: if earlier housing crisis (UK and Spain in the early 1990s) are any example, this will not 
happen for at least a decade, even under a moderate inflation scenario. 
Financial regulation reform needs to be seen in the context of the political constraints 
imposed by the current state of emergency, or political myopia, depending on perspective. The 
most prominent need for Europe seems to be mortgage product reform: both foreign currency and 
local currency ARM lending create massive moral hazard by both borrowers and lenders by 
destroying the willingness to pay for interest rate risk protection via fixed rates and generate 
mismatch risk with the basically fixed income stream from housing. These products also lay the 
foundation for dangerous risk layering, even in markets in which they have been established for 
generations, resulting in aggressive central bank intervention to bail out the system. A low 
discount factor as embedded in the ca. 3% interest rate level that Spanish or Irish homeowners 
have been paying for much of the last decade, permanently inflates house prices, and pricing a 
fixed income stream (saved rent payments) over the volatile short end of the yield curve also 
implies more volatile house prices. Changing the structural bias towards ARMs – e.g. by 
differentiating capital requirements or stress-testing during underwriting - appears more 
important than addressing temporary house price bubble endgame covenants, such as low 
amortisation or high LTVs, even though these practices deserve attention, too. However, the 
interest rate pass-through properties of ARMs on household debt service and consumption are 
also currently assisting central bank emergency action to reinflate the economy. This establishes a 
conflict between stability and pump-priming that needs to be addressed.  
Behind product reform there is need for financial institution reform: a liberalised mortgage 
finance system – as designed in the 1980s - relying mostly on commercial banks with their focus on 
ARM lending, their implicit government guarantees and interest subsidy relations with central 
banks, is bound to fail within a short period of time again. Europe has almost completely 
dismantled its specialist housing finance system offering FRM in the past two decades. It could 
take the opportunity of the crisis to consider bringing it back as a stable long-term option to isolate 
housing finance risk, make such risk transparent and strengthen the specialist knowledge and 
focus needed in the sector. A clean separation of risk would essentially be the ‘Volcker rule’ for 
long-term lending and with specialist subsidiaries could be compatible with a predominantly 
universal banking system. The alternative is the attempt to regulate large universal banks, which 
are fully aware of their political clout, and use it. The fierce rejection of the ‘Net Stable Funding 
Ratio’ by large European banks is a vivid illustration of the situation. 
When attempting to regulate, rather than actively shape the housing finance system, 
constraining the product set to the least dangerous and penalising risk layering should be the 
priority. It remains to be seen whether the Basel III process can produce agreement on a sensible 
framework for mortgage products. It is highly unlikely that the EU will do so, given the political 
economy, while the US, like the other large Basel III stakeholder, has put the issue on the agenda in 
Dodd-Frank. Consumer protection reforms in the EU, due to entrenched stakeholder interests, are 
bound to remain a slow process, unlikely to even reach the modest Consumer Credit Directive 
standard in the mortgage sector. Often, the opposition harms the very self-interest of the 
opponents – an example is Germany’s opposition to harmonising the fixed-rate mortgage 
prepayment regime that blocks an important export channel for capital surpluses into a relatively 
safe loan product.  
Suggestions that the EU – if it cannot positively agree on rules - might at least attempt to 
moderate or arbiter the myriad of national consumer protection regulations, e.g. by demanding – 
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along the lines of state aid regulations – empirical evidence of their stability vs. competition 
impact, remain unheard. Many discussions on mortgage finance on the EU level also appear 
confused, for example regarding the limitations of the APRC concept or the legal implications of 
‘suitability’ or ‘advice’. This demonstrates a gap of financial expertise and institution-building. It 
would seem from this perspective that a specialised European consumer finance agency along the 
lines of the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau might be best suited to advance the EU 
discussion. At least it could be a place in which to concentrate expertise and create a vested interest 
responding to the build-up of the European Banking Agency. 
Both Europe and the US finally need a turnaround of public housing policy to a new 
equilibrium. This should lie somewhere between the vast social housing expenses of the 1970s – a 
by-product of stagflation, which severely curtailed housing finance – and the view gaining ground 
since the 1980s that market-based lending can provide housing solutions to all stakeholders and 
minimalistic public intervention in the sector is sufficient. Europe needs to start to understand that 
– very much analogous to the US - the current fiscal crisis is not just the result of ‘lax lending 
standards’ in banking. Rather it is a reflection of the partial withdrawal of the public sector from 
social transfers and housing policy. 
Again, the organisation of the EU in this sector is dysfunctional: the housing sector has 
been left out of the EU’s operational ambit for fear that it might create another agricultural sector, 
i.e. demand huge subsidies from member states. Member states have cut back their budgets to near 
zero, and the sector remains inconsistently and diversely regulated across the continent. Without 
some co-ordination of national housing policies and regulations, e.g. in the areas of rent control, 
mortgage interest deduction, housing allowances or minimum scale of rental programmes 
benefiting young households and migrants, it is likely, however, that the crisis will be repeated as 
important housing market segments remain underserved. Too many consumers unfit to borrow 
will search for credit in this case, while the potential for safer lending to housing via corporate and 
non-profit (rental) investors will remain untapped.  
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3.  SELECTED MORTGAGE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ISSUES 
3.1  Introduction 
The EU Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) adopted in 1987, reformed in 2008, has taken a 
moderately interventionist approach to consumer credit regulation. It regulates pre-contractual 
transparency and a number of material consumer protection issues during the contract phase, but 
leaves out contract execution via foreclosure and the consumer insolvency regime.  
A full transposition to mortgage credit – some member states transpose the entire CCD and 
all others have transposed at least parts of it – has been pre-empted historically by concerns not to 
interfere with long-standing local industry practices and funding approaches.  
Moreover, in particular in Anglo-Saxon case law jurisdictions, material consumer protection 
going beyond the distribution phase has historically only developed over long periods of time as a 
result of a series of court judgments. In contrast, Roman (Napoleanic) law countries in continental 
Europe have been more aggressive in structuring products and limiting practices by law. While 
the outcome of both approaches may ultimately be similar, processes and time scales clearly differ.  
The difficulty to establish a consensus has therefore forced recent EU initiatives in mortgage 
credit to focus on transparency provisions. Only with the financial crisis did the White Paper of 
July 2010 add the aspect of responsible lending, i.e. proper conduct by lenders (and borrowers) 
when underwriting a mortgage loan.  
This approach still left aside all phases of the mortgage finance life-cycle beyond the point-
of-sale, and thus shortened the canon of issues contained in the CCD for the case of mortgage 
lending. The 2011 Directive proposal promptly has taken up many material consumer protection 
issues – particularly those of early repayment and rate adjustment – while still leaving out others 
(e.g. loan assignment during securitisation). 
The subsequent discussion therefore, by historical coincidence, broadly covers the ambit of 
the current Directive proposal. However, because this report was largely completed in February 
2011, no specific reference to the text of the Directive proposal is made. 
3.2  Credit distribution 
3.2.1  Mandatory provision of standardised pre-contractual information 
On the EU-level, pre-contractual information disclosure for mortgage credit is currently covered 
by the 2001 pan-European Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-contractual Information for Home 
Loans (the Code),26 which entitles consumers to receive a personalised European Standard 
Information Sheet (ESIS) prior to the conclusion of the loan contract. The latter is intended to 
facilitate consumers’ access to comprehensive and understandable as well as personalised key 
information items on the mortgage product of interest in a form. The idea is to enhance 
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comparability between various offers in order to narrow down the product menu according to 
their personal preferences prior to contract closure. The simplified ESIS has been designed as the 
counter model to over-information of the consumer through comprehensive and long, but hard to 
analyse and easy to manipulate information sets. This issue has been a key concern of consumer 
protection in the US mortgage sector.  
The latest available data provided by European Commission27 and the European Banking 
Industry Committee’s (EBIC) third progress report on the implementation of the code published in 
April 200928 show, however, that adherence to the Code is, despite improvements since 2001, 
unsatisfactory for several countries, although important country-specific differences do exist. 
Germany, the UK and Malta feature compliance rates of 100%, while the share of mortgage lenders 
providing the ESIS in France and Cyprus, for example, stands at only 45% or 58%, respectively (see 
Figure 10). Failure to comply could result in higher search costs for borrowers in those member 
states. 
 
Figure 10. Share of mortgage lenders providing the ESIS 
 
Source: 3rd EBIC progress report; own computations.  
 
Table 4 summarises the current legal situation and shows that the mortgage industry in 13 
countries has not explicitly advised lenders to adhere to the Code, while it has decided to respect 
the Code in 12 member states. Germany and Malta have transposed the Code into national 
legislation.  
Existing UK legislation in many areas goes beyond the Code, implying de-facto 
transposition. For example, the Key Facts Information (KFI) document requires the disclosure of 
the total amount payable, the impact of additional loan fees, commissions paid to third parties and 
specific risk factors (e.g. an interest-only loan). Conversely, among the items included in the Code 
but not in the KFI, are a demonstration of the effect of interest rate stress and a monthly 
amortisation table. This example demonstrates the differences in interpretation, or empirical 
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3rd%20EBIC%20Progress%20Report%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Code%20of%20Con
duct%20on%20Home%20Loans.pdf 
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evidence, which may result in over-information of consumers leading to confusion or a reduced 
attention span. 
 
Table 4. Level of industry adherence and implementation of the Code 
Country 
Explicit industry agreement 
of lenders to adhere to 
code? 
Code legally binding?  Percentage of 
national market 
adherence 
YES NO  YES  NO 
Austria   x    x  90 
Belgium x      x  90 
Bulgaria   x    x  unknown 
Cyprus x      x  58 
Czech Republic  x      x  78 
Denmark x      x  94 
Estonia x      x  99 
Finland x      x  99 
France x      x  45 
Germany x    x    100** 
Greece x      x  95 
Hungary x      x  unknown 
Ireland x      x  86 
Italy   x    x  79 
Latvia   x    x  4  lenders 
Lithuania   x    x  unknown 
Luxembourg  x    x  90 
Malta x    x    100** 
Netherlands  x    x  99 
Poland   x    x  0 
Portugal x      x  95.4 
Romania   x    x  unknown 
Slovakia   x    x  100 
Slovenia   x    x  0 
Spain   x    x  0 
Sweden x      x  90 
UK   x*    x  100 
TOTAL 14 13  2  25   
 
 
* In the UK, a Key Facts Information (KFI) sheet is provided. While this is not the same as the ESIS, the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) argues to fulfil the information requirements stipulated by the ESIS, or even go beyond 
these. 
** Through binding legislation. 
Source: CEPS. 
 
Consumer testing exercises carried out by the European Commission have revealed that the 
provision of pre-contractual information in a structured way is key to efficient information 
absorption, both in a general as well as specific form on the requested loan including 
characteristics, risks and costs of the loan. 
From this perspective, it seems evident that universal industry adherence to the Code or 
other minimum transparency requirements could bring benefits to European consumers, as well as 
to lenders facing unfair competition. The European Commission commissioned London 
Economics to assess this question in 2008, but so far no report has been published. In particular 
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side of the lenders. In addition, consumer groups have repeatedly criticised the absence of 
independent monitoring and credible enforcement mechanisms.29 
The European Commission’s impact assessment accompanying its 2007 “White Paper on the 
Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets”30 identified the following problems in relation to the 
provision of pre-contractual information on mortgage credit: 
•  insufficient and complex information;  
•  lack of EU-wide comparability; 
•  differences in the timing of providing pre-contractual information; and 
•  lack of credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
In addition to the wide variance of information content and lender practices that exists across 
the European Union, efforts to find a common standard have always also been handicapped by 
consumer heterogeneity, which sparked discussions on whether the point of reference should be 
the marginal (i.e. most vulnerable) or average consumer. Research has indeed shown that a 
majority of potential mortgage borrowers face difficulties in processing the information provided 
to them. A Eurobarometer survey, for example, carried out in 2005 indicated that 59% of EU 
citizens find it difficult “to understand the information given by financial institutions about the 
way mortgages work and the risks involved”.31 And while the use of the ESIS may have helped 
consumers to move up the learning curve,32 customers still struggle with complicated technical 
and legal terms as well as the complexity and breadth of product on offer.  
Europe has advanced with the single information sheet concept, with the aim of minimising 
confusion through over- or misleading information at least of those consumers who are able to 
process basic financial information. Concerning the substance, the creation of a tri-party 
commission (mortgage lenders, consumer groups and public administration) tasked with drawing 
up and formally authorising a new design could be considered. A working group consisting of 
mortgage banks and the consumer council is currently conducting such an effort on a national 
level in Denmark. 
The challenges in enhancing consumer education on mortgages can also be ascribed to the 
fact that taking out a mortgage is still a once-in-a-lifetime decision in many markets. This argues in 
particular for standardising certain information items and devising an official classification of 
products to allow comparisons. A Eurobarometer survey of 2009 shows that only around 50% of 
Europeans find the comparison of offers between mortgage providers easy to understand, with 
27% thinking it was ‘fairly difficult’ and 12% considering it ‘very difficult’.33  
The timing of the receipt of pre-contractual documents is another critical issue, if the goal is 
to enhance consumer options to ‘shop around’ and allow for an adequate period of reflection. As 
                                                      
29 According to the agreement on the code (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/ 
home-loans/agreement_en.pdf), the lending associations are to publish an annual progress report on the 
implementation of the code. The Commission is charged with monitoring the uptake and effectiveness of the 
code and review the operation of the code. The latter was done through a study by the Institute for Financial 
Services (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/home-loans/home-loans-final-
report_en.pdf).  
30 The White Paper and accompanying documents can be found on the Commission’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/credit/mortgage_en.htm).  
31 Special Eurobarometer 230 (2005), Public Opinion in Europe on Financial Services 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_230_en.pdf). 
32 Denmark opted for the use of the ESIS in the implementation of the CCD due to the familiarity of 
borrowers with the wording and layout. 
33 Flash Eurobarometer 243 (2009), Consumers’ view on switching service providers 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_243_en.pdf). A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 41 
the Code does not specify at what stage of the process the consumer has to be provided with the 
documents, potential borrowers are currently – depending on the country – receiving pre-
contractual information either together with the binding offer, in advance of a binding offer or 
only upon request.34 While virtually all stakeholders support the handout of the ESIS without 
delay, opinions are divided whether a specific number of days prior to contract signature should 
be required. A long period has implications for funding risks of lenders. 
The extension of the requirement to produce the ESIS to credit intermediaries also warrants 
further discussion. Despite setbacks after the crisis, intermediaries are a growing source of 
mortgages in Europe. A recent study carried out for the European Commission35 indicates that the 
share of intermediaries in the retailing of mortgages and other lending secured on own property 
reaches levels of 60% (Ireland) to 70% (UK), with the EU average amounting to 41.5% in 2007. 
Currently, intermediaries are not subject to the obligation to comply with the Code.36 
Intermediaries could at least act on behalf of lenders in delivering the ESIS, in order to further the 
goal of providing timely and understandable information.  
 
 
3.2.2  Standardised APRC calculations 
The Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC) is defined as the internal rate of return of future 
payment streams from consumers to lenders. It is a central element of the concept of disclosure 
since it was first introduced in the US Truth in Lending Act in 1968. A clearly understandable and 
EU-wide APRC should in theory help to increase mortgage market transparency and product 
comparability, allow lenders to benefit from an improved competition environment and 
consumers from lower search costs. However, matters are not as simple in long-term credit, which 
comes in a large number of varieties in a union of more than two dozen distinctive consumer 
finance markets.  
                                                      
34 “Monitoring the uptake and the effectiveness of the Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-contractual 
Information for Home Loans” (2003), Institute for Financial Services e.V (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/home-loans/home-loans-final-report_en.pdf).  
35 “Study on Credit Intermediaries in the Internal Market” (2009), European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/credit_intermediaries_report_en.pdf).  
36 Only in eight countries (AT, BE, DE, DK, IT, NL, SK, UK) has the industry decided that intermediaries, in 
addition to the lenders, should respect the code.  
POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The provision of pre-contractual information has been the least-contested element of mortgage 
consumer protection. In order to improve the current legal framework, EU policy-makers should 
consider: 
-  Making the handing out of the European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS), currently governed 
by a self-regulatory Code of Conduct, a legal obligation. 
-  Obliging not only lenders but also credit intermediaries to provide potential borrowers with the 
ESIS. 
-  Introducing improvements (simplification and format) to the ESIS through a tri-party approach 
(mortgage lenders, consumer associations, public administration), considering the actual use by 
consumers. 
-  Specifying the timing of information disclosure in order to give consumers the time to consider the 
offer, coupled with the introduction of the possibility for consumers to waive the reflection period. 42 | SELECTED MORTGAGE CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES DISCUSSED BY THE TASK FORCE 
As of today, and in contrast to consumer credit, APRCs for mortgage financing are not 
harmonised by a common computation methodology through EU-wide legislation. In fact, legal 
requirements setting out the specificities for the calculation of the APRC for mortgages do not even 
exist in every member state. Common (national) rules are applied in only 16 EU countries. In 
particular, most emerging European markets still do not apply an APRC. Table 5 provides an 
overview. 
 
Table 5. Overview of countries with legal specification for the calculation of the APRC 
Country 
Does a legal specification for the 
calculation of the APRC Exist? 
NO YES 
Austria   x 
Belgium x   
Bulgaria x   
Cyprus x   
Czech Republic  x   
Denmark   x 
Estonia   x 
Finland   x 
France   x 
Germany   x 
Greece x   
Hungary   x 
Ireland   x 
Italy   x 
Latvia x   
Lithuania x   
Luxembourg x   
Malta   x 
Netherlands x  
Poland x   
Portugal   x 
Romania x   
Slovakia   x 
Slovenia   x 
Spain   x 
Sweden   x 
UK   x 
TOTAL 11  16 
 
Source: CEPS. 
 
The preservation of the status quo of no harmonisation of APRC cost elements and 
computation methods is clearly unacceptable to the European Commission. Policy options 
formulated for the London Economics study discuss variants of the breadth of the APRC 
definition:  
-  narrow definition (all costs paid to the lender for his own benefit);  
-  a broad definition (all costs paid by the consumer, including to third parties); or  A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 43 
-  on the basis of an alignment with the provisions set out in the CCD (“all the costs, including 
interest, commissions, taxes, fees for credit intermediaries and any other fees which the 
consumer has to pay in connection with the credit agreement, except for notarial costs”37). 
This menu is reflected in the European Commission’s impact assessment accompanying its 
2007 “White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets”, which refers to two issues 
to be taken into consideration in the process of finding a common methodology for APRC 
calculation: i) the recipient of the payment of the costs on the one side and ii) the relation of these 
costs to the credit (direct vs. indirect costs). The former aims to separate costs levied by the lender 
(interest and commission payments) from payments made to third parties (insurance premiums, 
notary costs or taxes), while the latter targets the differentiation between costs related to the 
establishment of the mortgage loan and the charges and fees over and above the direct cost of the 
funds taken out by the borrower (cost of a survey for the establishment of the surety of a loan, file 
opening fees, etc.).  
APRC harmonisation could have a positive impact on consumers via an improved 
comparability of prices of different offers. By including relevant non-interest rate cost factors, the 
risk could be mitigated that consumers are misled towards only superficially more attractive 
offers. The classic case has been a loan offered at a lower interest rate, e.g. 6% instead of 6.5%, but 
disbursed at a disagio (or points), e.g. at 98% instead of 100%. Both products could have the same 
APRC, but look very different to consumers. The trouble is that such simple situations are today 
only found in emerging mortgage markets in Eastern Europe, which offer very few products. The 
rest of the European mortgage market has become far more complex. 
Consumer groups have for long been supporting a broad definition of the APRC that is also 
embedded in the CCD, i.e. one that includes all associated costs and fees borne by the borrower, 
including insurance/surety and other third-party-induced cost. Notary costs are exempted since 
they can strongly vary across jurisdictions. Lenders tend to reject the call to include third-party 
costs as this may slow down underwriting and raise liability issues between legally distinct 
providers of services when quoting each others’ prices to consumers. A broader APRC in this 
perspective might even decrease consumer benefit by disclosing the APRC necessarily only late in 
the underwriting process, when all such information becomes available. 
The complexity of European mortgage products renders a total cost concept a difficult tool to 
use for comparison purposes, in particular across borders. Even when limited to a simple setup – 
say comparing the cost of a 90% LTV loan with mortgage insurance with a 90% LTV loan on which 
the lender takes the entire credit risk himself – matters become complex, e.g. due to different 
quality of mortgage collateral, insurance coverage or pricing standards across borders. A definition 
in that case would conceptually at least have to assume a specific credit support and risk profile of 
the borrower in order to make sense. Comparable information seems hard to create and 
communicate to borrowers, and even more difficult to police. Such arguments would speak in 
favour of quoting the narrow cost of a standardised loan (e.g. mortgage surety, 80% LTV, prime 
borrower) to have at least one like-to-like cross-border comparison.  
A possible compromise between the competing comprehensive cost information and the 
comparability interest could be to consider the broad CCD APRC definition as mandatory for 
mortgage finance on the national level, with parameters specified on the national level. A narrow 
APRC concept leaning on the CCD concept of the ‘borrowing rate’ could then also be made 
mandatory in order to ease cross-border comparisons. The risk of over-information seems limited 
in this approach, compared e.g. to price quotation practices in other consumer sectors (say, cellular 
phone contracts) and given the financial relevance of the housing investment for the consumer. 
                                                      
37 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
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These questions, high on the Commission’s agenda, unfortunately neglect the enormous 
importance of additional safeguards to protect the consumer from misinterpretation or 
misinformation. Most important here is the need to classify mortgage loans prior to applying the 
APRC. This is critical since stating a price without describing the risk and other important features 
does not allow for meaningful comparison domestically, let alone between heterogeneous product 
classes internationally. Consider as an analogy the protection different car products offer drivers in 
case of an accident, which typically reflected production costs and prices, which most consumers 
understand easily. This is less so in the case of consumer finance regarding the risk transferred by 
products. The attempt in the White Paper to make assumptions for variable-rate loans implicitly 
acknowledges this problem. In fact, several stakeholders have gone further and called for using the 
APRC as only one of several key figures (rather than a solitary measure for mortgage comparison). 
Conceivable product classes in the interest-rate risk dimension would be reviewable-rate 
mortgages, index-tracker mortgages, short-term/reset non-callable fixed-rate mortgages and 
mortgages fixed to maturity with prepayment option. Fixed-to-float mortgages should be classified 
according to their dominant loan phase – in a product with a long initial fixed rate period – e.g. 5 
or 10 years - this will be the fixed-rate; a product with just a short fixed-rate teaser will be classified 
as variable (ARM). Obviously, a harmonisation of early repayment indemnities (see below) would 
support the harmonisation of APRCs, since it would permit a comparison of maturities of 
prepayment-protected (‘non-callable’) fixed-rate mortgages across Europe. 
In addition, product subclasses would have to be differentiated with regard to the presence 
of interest rate caps, prepayment indemnity formulations, pre-savings requirements, other 
consumer options (e.g. portability to a different house) and certain credit features. If necessary, 
specific option costs or idiosyncratic cost components could be either stripped or merged in order 
to reach comparability.  
Dealing with loan rate variability is an additional issue, given the increase in ARMs in 
Europe in the past two decades. Obvious problems are the unpredictable changes in market 
circumstances on the one side and different rate adjustment processes applied by lenders on the 
other.  
Consider for example a standard variable rate (SVR) loan with a 2-year initial period of low 
fixed rates (‘teaser’), followed by a variable interest rate determined by the lender and which is 
unknown in advance. This has been the most popular loan product in the UK; similar products 
have also gained in popularity in the US during the housing boom (so-called ‘hybrid’ ARMs). 
Applying the APRC over the fixed-rate period is misleading for such a product, as it is usually a 
teaser (below-market) rate. Even the concept of an ‘initial’ APRC – comparing the teaser rates only 
– is misleading, since the lender can ‘claw back’ any discount by a certain amount of overcharging 
in the variable rate loan phase. The interest rate, finally, that the lender will charge on the variable-
rate phase, is unknown in the case of the SVR. In contrast, so-called ‘tracker’ ARMs, following an 
inflation or interbank cost of fund index with constant contractual spreads, can be compared with 
relative ease.  
Both SVR and index-tracker products have in common that they convey considerable 
interest-rate risk to consumers. According to the White Paper, the potentially very low current 
interest rate shall be assumed to prevail for the life of the loan, instead of serving as a 
representative interest rate for the life of the loan (for example, an historical average).  
The current interest rate approach is taken by the CCD for short-term loans with some 
justification, but it is highly questionable for long-term lending. Data presented in chapter 1 show 
that the misleading of consumers in mortgage finance is not just theory. ARM demand is highest 
when the yield curve is steepest, reflecting the reaction of borrowers to price signals and their 
assumption that they remain permanently low. This assumption is bolstered by the officially 
implemented APRC calculation methodologies, which suggest the same constancy of short-term 
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protection against future interest rate risk is so, and that by implication the borrower going for an 
ARM takes a higher interest risk than usual. 
The approach is even more dubious if, as intended by the CCD total cost of credit approach 
regarding cost elements, the intention of the APRC is to inform the consumer about the maximum 
cost, i.e. personal financial risk, incurred when servicing the loan. Consistency with that concept 
would imply informing consumers in with distribution data, i.e. showing the highest and lowest 
ARM interest rate charged over a sufficiently long historical period of time.  
Similar considerations apply to mortgages denominated in foreign currencies, a common 
practice in Eastern European markets. Given the highly volatile nature of exchange rates, current 
exchange rate levels are very poor predictors of future exchange rate developments. Currency risk 
often adds to interest rate risks in the case of foreign currency ARMs (e.g. a Swiss Franc loan 
priced over Swiss short-term interbank rates, as practiced in Poland).  
Another mortgage-specific issue to be resolved is the length of the repayment period taken 
into account for the calculation of the APRC. Should the benchmark be the actual life of the 
mortgage, i.e. the typical average number of years until prepayment, or the contractually agreed 
term to maturity? The effective costs of a loan depend on the borrower’s prepayment behaviour. In 
some jurisdictions almost no loan reaches contractual maturity, and in particular the comparison 
of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) will be misleading without considering prepayment behaviour. 
The comparison of the typical US product, a 30-year pre-payable fixed-rate loan, with the typical 
German product, a 10-year fixed-rate loan with prepayment indemnity or exclusion, can serve as 
an example. Since US borrowers frequently exercise the prepayment option, the effective duration 
of the US loan is between 4 and 7 years, after which a new loan is closed. Germans, in contrast, 
because of the legal structure, basically prepay only when moving house, which hardly reduces 
the duration of the loan below 10 years. In effect, the German loan has therefore a longer duration 
than the US loan, even though its fixing period is far shorter, and closing costs will be amortised 
over longer periods, which leads to distorted APRC results. Ideally, thus, APRC concepts should 
use a statistically meaningfully derived expected rather than contractual maturity measure to 
avoid economically pointless and misleading results. If that cannot be achieved due to data 
problems, reducing the maturity assumption behind the APRC formula from contractual to a 
lower figure reflecting typical prepayment behaviour, e.g. 5 or 10 years, will be an acceptable 
substitute.  
The German fixed-to-term loan (Abschnittsfinanzierung) has run into another difficulty: 
technically, the fixed-rate period is initial, even if it is 10 or 15 years long, and contract conditions 
typically state as default that it is followed by a variable-rate phase for the rest of the loan 
maturity. However, almost all German loans are rolled over into a new fixed-rate phase. An APRC 
taken over the combined initial fixed-rate and subsequent variable-rate phase, assuming today’s 
variable-rate level, will thus end up with a rate indication that is lower than the initial fixed-rate 
level. This is the reverse problem compared to the typical UK fixed-to-float product. 
The Austrian or German Bauspar loan could serve as an example for the problems of 
computing the APRC for combined mortgage products: the product entails a long savings phase 
(e.g. 5 years) preceding the loan phase (e.g. 15 years). The loan phase benefits from below-market 
mortgage rates, and the borrower in exchange receives very low deposit rates only. Taking the 
APRC over the lower loan rate only, while failing to include the below-market deposit rate, gives a 
misleading picture. Technical solutions to taking a joint APRC over both phases, at least for 
products with immediate disbursement of an interim loan to be prepaid by the Bauspar loan, are 
straightforward. 
Additional problems arise when smaller loans – such as Bauspar loans, typically second 
mortgages – are combined with first mortgages. So far, we are not aware of any member state 
regulation that would force lenders to indicate a joint APRC of both steps in the financing process. 
This has crucial implications for comparability of combined financing with a single financing 
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POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A clearly understandable and EU-wide common calculation of the APRC could increase mortgage 
market transparency and product comparability, allow lenders to benefit from an improved 
competition environment and consumers from lower search costs. To this end, EU policy-makers 
should: 
-  Align APRC computation methods with the provisions set out in the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD). 
-  Address the narrow vs. broad APRC question by quoting total cost of credit according to the CCD concept 
and a narrow APRC, reflecting the lender-induced cost only. Given the large variety and national 
specificity of mortgage products and combinations thereof within the EU, a narrow APRC definition 
serves cross-border comparisons better than the broad CCD definition. In contrast, the broad CCD 
definition serves better to protect consumers against hidden cost surprises in the established national 
mortgage markets. The risk of consumer over-information appears limited. 
-  Introduce a combined APRC if and when different loan, or combined loan, savings or insurance, 
components are offered simultaneously to consumers. 
-  Formulate reasonable APRC assumptions, differentiated by product class, that address the described 
problems arising from interest rate fixing and adjustment mechanisms changing between loan phases. 
-  Rationalise the assumptions behind the APRC of variable-rate loans, quoting in addition long-term 
average rates representative of the maturity horizon of the loan as opposed to simply extrapolating today’s 
variable loan rate and pre-empting quotes based on the initial discount rate. 
-  Reduce the maturity assumption in the APRC, however, from extremely long contractual maturity to 
expected maturity, given early repayment options. 
3.2.3  Financial advice and qualified credit intermediation 
In the light of existing consumer heterogeneity in large mortgage portfolios and abuses seen both 
in the US and Europe, improvements in the area of disclosure standards alone might not 
sufficiently protect consumers. Consumer vulnerability can be aggravated by growing mortgage 
product complexity in combination with ever-increasing ranges of both product offers38 and 
product providers on the supply side and limited levels of financial literacy on the demand side. 
This situation renders the provision of financial explanations and advice critical in order to 
optimally match a specific borrower with the most suitable loan product. In fact, many consumers 
consciously seek to compensate for their difficulties in understanding credit products and 
information overload by (excessive) reliance on counselling given by the lenders themselves or 
(tied and untied) intermediaries.  
In its 2010 Working Paper on Responsible Mortgage Lending and Borrowing, the European 
Commission defines ‘advice’ as a financial service separate from the granting of credit, constituting 
“the provision of a personal recommendation to a consumer on suitable credit agreements for that 
consumer’s needs and financial situation, either upon his request or at the initiative of the creditor 
or credit intermediary providing advice”. Currently, however, and despite the EU executive’s 
                                                      
38 The FSA’s 2009 Data Pack, a supplement to its Mortgage Market Review, shows that lenders responded to 
the pre-crisis market growth by introducing many new products in the UK. At the peak of the mortgage 
market in 2007, more than 12,000 mortgage products were available with 8,000 specifically marketed to 
credit-impaired borrowers. According to figures presented by Forbrugerrådet, the Danish Consumer 
Council, the last 20 years of financial innovation drove the figure of possible housing loan variants from 
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positioning in its 2007 “White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets”, there are 
no EU-wide rules or standards in the area of mortgage credit.39  
Table 6 shows that 16 member states have specific rules and standards for the provision of 
mortgage advice, while five member states feature only recommendations or guidelines. In four 
countries – Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania and Romania – there is currently neither specific 
legislation nor recommendations in place with regard to provision of mortgage credit advice. 
 
Table 6. Overview of countries with legal requirement for the provision of mortgage advice 
Country 
Rules on provision of mortgage advice 
No legal 
texts 
Recommendation or 
guideline 
Legal provisions 
Austria     x 
Belgium     x 
Bulgaria   x   
Cyprus     x 
Czech Republic      x 
Denmark    x 
Estonia   x   
Finland   x   
France    x 
Germany    x 
Greece    x 
Hungary    x 
Ireland    x 
Italy x     
Latvia     x 
Lithuania x    
Luxembourg x     
Netherlands     x 
Poland    x 
Portugal     x 
Romania x     
Slovakia   x   
Slovenia     x 
Spain     x 
Sweden   x   
UK     x 
TOTAL 4  5  17 
 
Note: No information on Malta. 
Source: CEPS. 
                                                      
39 Nor does the Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) regulate advice. Paragraph 5(6) merely obliges 
creditor and credit intermediaries to “provide adequate explanations to the consumer”. In other areas of 
financial services, however, certain advice standards have been set: Article 19(1) of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID, 2004/39/EC) imposes on investment firms the obligation to “obtain the 
necessary information regarding the client's or potential client's knowledge and experience in the investment 
field relevant to the specific type of product or service, his financial situation and his investment objectives”. 
Article 12(3) of the Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD, 2002/92/EC) lays down similar provision for 
insurance intermediaries and in Article 12(2) obliges the latter “to give that advice on the basis of an analysis 
of a sufficiently large number of insurance contracts available on the market, to enable him to make a 
recommendation, in accordance with professional criteria, regarding which insurance contract would be 
adequate to meet the customer's needs” if the intermediary claims to give advice “on the basis of a fair 
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While on average slightly more than nine in ten EU citizens (92%) state that they make their 
“own decisions what to do with [their] money”, consumers’ expectations in their financial 
institutions to provide them with advice on products and services offered were confirmed by an 
EU-wide survey of the European Commission conducted in 2005: Figure 11 demonstrates that 
percentages of respondents expecting “financial institutions to give […] advice” ranged from a low 
38% in Hungary and Latvia to 95% in Slovenia, with the EU average standing at around 72%.40 
While the results are hard to interpret, the wide variety of expectations measured seems to hint at 
a vastly differing credibility of financial institutions in a potential advisory role. 
 
Figure 11. Proportion of EU citizens expecting provision of advice 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 230 (2005): Public Opinion in Europe on Financial Services. 
 
More specific to mortgage financing, an online survey of 2,500 customers across five markets 
(France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK) carried out in 2006 by Oliver Wyman41 found that 
the proportion of customers choosing mortgage products on the basis of advice varies from 60 to 
76%. These findings are correlated with the Eurobarometer data regarding advice expectations of 
consumers for the surveyed countries (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Proportion of customers expecting financial advice and choosing mortgage product on this basis 
  Percentage of EU citizens expecting 
provision of advice, 2005 
Percentage of customers choosing mortgage 
products on basis of advice, 2006 
Spain 45  60 
France 68  72 
UK 77  67 
Sweden 82  76 
Germany 94  76 
 
Sources: Special Eurobarometer 230 (2005): Public Opinion in Europe on Financial Services, Oliver Wyman and CEPS comparison. 
                                                      
40 Special Eurobarometer 230 (2005): Public Opinion in Europe on Financial Services 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_230_en.pdf). 
41 Oliver Wyman (2007). “European mortgage distribution: Changing channel choices” 
(http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/european_mortg_dist_RBB_0307.pdf). 
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Similar to the discussions revolving around the variance of disclosure standards and 
(country-)specific lender practices, consumer needs may strongly differ in terms of how much (or 
whether at all) financial advice is needed and/or demanded. 
The European Commission’s impact assessment accompanying its 2007 “White Paper on the 
Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets” has identified “sub-optimal” advice as a key problem 
in EU mortgage markets. The European Commission has since repeatedly attempted to clarify that 
any efforts to promote high-level mortgage advice standards in order to govern conduct of 
business in this area did not inevitably entail a legal obligation for lenders or intermediaries to 
actually provide advice.  
Defining advice as a non-obligatory, separate financial service is problematic due to a lack of 
consumer willingness, and sometimes ability, to pay an independent advisor. Lenders, however, 
are under too much conflict of interest to sell products to be mandated to give advice. Still, there is 
some hope that regulation thrust and market reality can be reconciled, given recent trends in the 
mortgage industry. 
In particular, better financial advice may be facilitated by the rise of credit intermediation. In 
the UK, for example, a moderate 38% of closings made by banks and other lenders between April 
2008 and March 2009 were based in part on advice received. This stands in contrast to 90% of 
mortgage sales by credit intermediaries that were advised.42 Some 70% of mortgage originations 
are intermediated. As far as the U.K is concerned, therefore, rulemaking on advice for 
intermediaries is more relevant. Moreover, intermediaries can be assumed to act more 
independently than banks. This moves the discussion to the question of potentially inappropriate 
forms of remuneration offered by lenders that might tilt the intermediary’s incentives to giving up 
his independence and to distributing a certain product by a certain lender. The majority of credit 
intermediaries earn money by charging lenders (downstream charges to consumers are much less 
common). Volume-based fees appear to be the most common payment scheme applied in the EU.43  
The provision of impartial advice to potential borrowers can sit uncomfortably with volume-
based fees as intermediaries are incentivised to ‘close the deal’ and sign a maximum number of 
contracts. Similar considerations hold true for varying levels of fee payments for the sale of 
different products (alignment of the broker fee with the profitability of the loan to the lender) or 
full up-front fee payments (no credit risk sharing between lender and intermediary, as in the case 
of trailing fees).  
There are potential market mechanisms that can help ameliorate this risk: fees on prime 
mortgages in the UK market for example tend to be fairly homogenous at 0.3–0.35 per cent, and 
potentially detrimental differentiation of fees is closely monitored by the FSA. Intermediary 
concern with reputational risk and the likelihood of repeat business or referrals from customers 
may also play a role. 
Given the complexity of the issue, the routes taken by regulators to regulate intermediaries 
have been varying. Unsurprisingly, the most intensive regulation in the credit business has 
occurred in the markets with the most active role of intermediaries (i.e. UK, Ireland, Netherlands, 
see Figure 12). One approach has been to demand that a firm calling itself “independent 
intermediary” fulfils institutional independence requirements (as is done in the Netherlands); this 
is already a requirement in European law in the insurance business (10% shareholding limit). A 
second approach has been intensified supervision, which restricts market entry. The UK FSA de-
                                                      
42 Financial Services Authority (2009). Mortgage Product Sales Data (PSD) Trends Report 
(http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/mortgage_report_09%20final.pdf).  
43 For a detailed reading on the economic contribution of credit intermediaries and various forms of 
remuneration, the reader is referred to a study carried out for the European Commission by Europe 
Economics (2009), “Study on Credit Intermediaries in the Internal Market” 
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facto supervises intermediaries on the individual transaction level and can hence establish a case of 
mis-selling swiftly, if needed. Complementary, and less costly, approaches include enhanced 
professional standards, such as conduct-of-business rules, formalised systems of redress and 
enhanced transparency of the intermediary relationship with the lender. 
 
Figure 12. Extent of statutory regulation of residential mortgage intermediaries (2008) 
 
Source: Europe Economics. 
 
Given the lack of development of regulation, transparency plays the key role so far for the 
majority of member states. As critical as it may be, however, studies have shown that transparency 
is not sufficient to address problems: a study carried out by the Federal Trade Commission in 2004, 
in which a group of recent mortgage borrowers were asked to compare two loans (one with broker 
fee and related disclosure of its value, the other without broker fee) and identify the cheaper one. It 
revealed a potential for detriment as consumers may be confused by full fee disclosure: only 63-
72% of the tested consumers successfully identified the less expensive loan – as opposed to 90% in 
the case without fee disclosure, so that the proportion failing to identify the cheaper loan tripled. 
In addition to consumer confusion, disclosure that focuses exclusively on the remuneration of 
intermediaries could bias consumers against intermediated products, which may reduce the 
likelihood of receiving independent advice. 44 Intermediary market share has become more volatile 
recently, as UK data suggest. The share of intermediated mortgage sales peaked in 2007 at 62%, 
but from Q1 2008 onwards, the ratio consistently declined to 47% by the end of 2009.45  
Regarding advice provided by lenders, the result of several rounds of stakeholder meetings 
and discussions has shown that they are generally not opposed to providing advice but would 
strongly reject a legal duty to do so. Calls to introduce such a duty (as was for example stipulated – 
under strong disagreement between participating parties – by the final report of the EU Forum 
                                                      
44 “The Effect of Mortgage Broker Compensation Disclosures on Consumers and Competition: A Controlled 
Experiment”, James M. Lacko and Janis K. Pappalardo (2004), Federal Trade Commission Bureau of 
Economics Staff Report (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/030123mortgagefullrpt.pdf). 
45 Financial Services Authority (2010). Mortgage Product Sales Data (PSD) Trend Report 2005-2010 
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Group on Mortgage Credit)46 are rejected as lenders point to their conflict of interest when being 
mandated to perform counselling. Their economic goal is indeed to sell the most profitable 
product, which will be difficult to reconcile with the requirement to sell in parallel a public good, 
advice to consumers on their financial circumstances. This holds even true if lenders themselves 
bear the cost of a mis-selling as investors in the loan, since short-term profitability considerations 
might push the potential long-term default risk as a consideration aside. If implemented, 
mandating advice would increase lender liability, impose strong litigation risks on lenders and 
subsequently most probably reduce incentives for product innovation and cause a simultaneous 
mutualisation of costs among consumers.47 
Consumer groups argue that in the absence of such a duty, however, and combined with the 
still low market shares of intermediaries in most EU member states that could provide advice as an 
alternative, consumer confidence and mobility may be hampered. This would result from legal 
uncertainties caused by unclear attribution of liability as well as possible redress mechanisms in 
the case of damages occurred through the provision of low-quality or inappropriate advice.  
One solution to this conflict could be more government-sponsored, independent consumer 
networks that complement intermediaries in providing third-party advice. Germany already has 
such a structure, in which the Verbraucherzentralen and credit broker networks such as Dr. Klein 
or Creditweb de-facto compete on providing advisory services to consumers. Clearly, two different 
solutions with two different subsidy/pricing regimes can give rise to distortions; a regulation 
option could be to limit publicly sponsored entities to advisory services, while allowing 
intermediaries to provide more complete matching services. 
Government sponsorship could also be replaced by industry sponsorship, e.g. via a low 
contribution per credit closed. Charging for example 1 basis point on the 6 trillion Euro mortgage 
market would yield 600 million Euro per annum for independent consumer advisory services. The 
industry’s benefit from this solution would be vastly reduced legal risk and fairer competition 
between lenders via better advised consumers. Such networks could also, over the long-term, 
improve the financial education level of consumers, even if the success chances of such efforts are 
regularly doubted by stakeholders and academics.48 
When forcing lenders to provide advice, in contrast, this would likely have to be even more 
tightly regulated than in the case of intermediaries. Objective benchmarks, rather than mere 
meeting protocols, as currently is widely the legal requirement and practice, would have to be set 
against which the quality of advice given could be effectively assessed. Yet, policing is difficult and 
without more networks supporting them, consumers would still lack (legal) clarity with respect to 
the possibilities of successfully pursuing a case. This not only holds true for borrowers in a single 
country without such standards but also for borrowers demanding cross-border services between 
two countries with varying stringency levels of existing rules.  
                                                      
46 European Commission (2004). The Integration of the EU Mortgage Credit Markets – Report by the Forum 
Group on Mortgage Credit: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/home-loans/ 
2004-report-integration_en.pdf 
47 For reasons laid out in the previous paragraphs (conflict of interest creation through fee structures) 
intermediaries too (both untied and tied) would be weak candidates for rules imposing a duty to advice. 
48 At a conference hosted by the European Commission’s DG SANCO on behavioural economics in the area 
of retail investment products on 11 November 2011, Harvard Professor David Laibson stated that the need 
for financial literacy is not backed by any evidence suggesting that efforts to introduce financial education 
programs are necessarily worth the money being spent on it. Laibson was supported by representatives of 
the consortium responsible for a recent Commission study on “Consumer Decision-Making in Retail 
Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics Perspective”, who pointed at the weak efficacy of long-term 
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Finally, the most drastic approach to the issue would be to reduce product complexity, in 
order to bring the product menu back in line with financial education levels. Consumer 
representatives argue that new layers of complexity in mortgage products are nullifying the 
positive impact of some financial innovation over the past years (such as, e.g. flexible payment 
loans). They point at a positive correlation between the speed of the creation of new (mortgage) 
products and the amount of financial advice requested by customers to get orientation. Anecdotal 
evidence from Denmark for example suggests that virtually no mortgage loan is sold without a 
form of supporting financial advice. This supports the above UK figures on the high share of 
advised sales. Even without curbing the product menu, any further increase in diversity could 
defeat efforts to enhance the impact of advice by improving its quality, or make advice even more 
costly. It seems in the interest of both consumers and industry to review the product menu and 
consider moves towards certain product standardisation, or at least greater transparency. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Increased mortgage product complexity, numbers of product offers and providers on the supply side renders 
the provision of financial advice to consumers critical. In the light of conflicts of interest in this area, EU policy-
makers should: 
-  refrain from making the provision of financial advice by lenders a legal requirement but instead create a 
framework for ensuring that where advice is given, it is of a recognisably high standard; 
-  refrain from prohibiting certain forms of remuneration for credit intermediation, but rather demand 
consistency with the obligation of intermediaries to act in the customer’s best interests, which might 
include a trail arrangement;  
-  ensure that credit intermediaries are sufficiently institutionally independent and operate under 
minimum professional standards; 
-  address the limitations of financial education more proactively and provide financial advice to 
consumers via government-sponsored entities or programs. This could help to reduce the currently 
strong reliance on banks and credit intermediaries regarding financial advice. 
 
3.3  Underwriting 
3.3.1  Assessing loan affordability 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the expansion of lending down the consumer credit curve has been 
excessive as a structural trend in many markets. Additionally, in situations of cyclically inflated 
house price levels underwriting standards have demonstrably temporarily declined – e.g. loan-to-
value ratios increased, amortisation payments were reduced (see Figure 6), and/or the share of 
ARM increased -, only to be tightened again shortly after the price collapse in a credit crunch. In 
both cases, the result has been the occurrence of underwriting practices mismatching with 
borrower repayment abilities. 
The empirical message from the structural trends observed lies in calling for changes in the 
broader policy framework of the sector, including transfers and housing policy. Clearly, reducing 
credit cannot be the task of the banking industry alone when alternative housing options are 
unavailable. Also, general macroeconomic conditions conducive to lending booms are beyond the 
financial regulation ambit. However, the longer-term trends also contain a warning regarding risk 
amnesia when dealing with established products and practices, in particular when they convey 
payment shock risk that eventually materialises, in particular in the case of financially vulnerable 
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The pro-cyclical characteristics of underwriting are seemingly universal. They signal that 
while proper risk assessment is surely in the long-term interest of lenders and well established in 
lending guidelines, short-termism – e.g. unleashed by competitive dynamics - might tilt the balance 
towards excessive risk-taking.  
Turning to the regulatory response, the Joint Forum – in a report for the G20 – in January 
2010 assumed that “systemic risk will be reduced if mortgages are properly underwritten” and if it 
can be ensured that “borrowers have the capacity and economic incentive to honour their 
commitments to retire the debt in a reasonable period of time”.49 The adoption of minimum 
underwriting standards focusing on consumers’ repayment capacities hence features in the 
Forum’s 17 recommendations. 
The European Union on her part nurses hopes that general legal requirements could strengthen 
incentives for better underwriting. According to the European Commission’s 2010 Working Paper on 
Responsible Mortgage Lending and Borrowing lenders need first to be able to access all relevant 
sources of information and secondly be able to correctly interpret data on potential borrowers 
received. The importance of comprehensive, comparable, up-to-date and accurate credit 
information in the process of assessing the creditworthiness of a potential borrower (as well as the 
suitability of a given product for a certain type of consumer) is largely uncontested. Appropriate 
credit risk models or other risk approximation techniques that adequately address consumers’ risk 
profiles and hence the probability of loan default also can only be developed and applied 
efficiently under the condition of data availability. This includes internal data gathered through 
already existing (long-term) client-lender relationships or data retrieved directly from the potential 
borrower.  
EU-wide legislation is planned that demands from lenders to do creditworthiness 
assessments. Yet lenders do already have to undertake the necessary checks on the financial 
background of potential borrowers under general national banking laws or as an integral part of 
their business operations. Sometimes, loan volume limits apply in these laws, making this less 
visible. For instance German Kreditwesengesetz technically does not require a creditworthiness 
assessment on a loan of or below the size of financing a typical apartment. However, other German 
regulations, such as the “Mindestanforderungen für das Kreditgeschäft” (minimum conduct 
requirement for the credit business) then result in a de-facto requirement to do a credit assessment 
even below such limits. Beyond national legislation, any legal requirements is in addition to the 
provisions already set out in the Capital Requirements Directive50 on reserve requirements and 
risk-weighing. 
With regard to the national level, Table 8 shows that specific legal requirements (or industry 
guidelines/recommendations) are missing only in eight member states, while 18 member states do 
in one form or another encourage mortgage providers to conduct a creditworthiness assessment 
prior to making a lending decision. 
 
Table 8. Overview of countries with legal requirement for assessment of consumer creditworthiness 
Country  Legal requirement for 
                                                      
49 Basel Committee on Banking Supervisions, The Joint Forum (2010). Review of the Differentiated Nature 
and Scope of Financial Regulation – Key Issues and Recommendations: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint24.pdf 
50 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking 
up and pursuit of the business of a credit institution (recast) and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions (recast): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006L0048:EN:NOT 
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creditworthiness assessment? 
YES NO 
Austria   x 
Belgium x   
Bulgaria x   
Cyprus x   
Czech Republic  x   
Denmark   x 
Estonia x   
Finland x   
France   x 
Germany x  
Greece x   
Hungary x   
Ireland x   
Italy x   
Latvia x   
Lithuania x  
Luxembourg   x 
Netherlands x   
Poland x   
Portugal   x 
Romania x   
Slovakia   x 
Slovenia   x 
Spain   x 
Sweden x   
UK x   
TOTAL 18  8 
 
Note: No information on Malta. 
Source: CEPS. 
 
While this overall picture is subject to change as certain countries opt to apply Article 8 of the 
CCD to housing lending and thus introduce a legal obligation to assess the creditworthiness of 
consumers, lenders in a residuum quantity of member states not transposing the CCD might avoid 
this requirement without a specific EU regulation.  
Ample room for interpretation within Article 8 of the CCD could also hinder the removal of 
regulatory differences with regard to requirements for lenders to obtain credit information “where 
necessary on the basis of a consultation of a relevant database” (Art. 8, CCD).51 A recently 
conducted survey among members of the Association of Consumer Credit Information Suppliers 
(ACCIS)52 indicates that a legal obligation on the lender to consult credit reporting databases 
currently exists in only two of the 17 covered EU member states, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Interestingly, in three further EU-27 countries (Greece, Hungary and Slovenia) the sharing of credit 
                                                      
51 With its transposition, the CCD will also, where applied to mortgage, support the elimination of barriers 
for cross-border database access for lenders through the non-discriminatory access provision of Article 9. 
Currently, relevant legal obstacles remain in all but five member states (Finland, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden 
and the UK). 
52 The European Credit Information Landscape – An analysis of a survey of credit bureaus in Europe, ECRI 
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data is required by national regulation, despite the absence of provisions to consult the database 
holding credit information before the loan transaction. This situation is depicted in Table 9, which 
also includes information on the non-EU member states Croatia, Iceland, Serbia, Russia and 
Turkey. 
 
 
Table 9. Voluntary vs. required sharing of and access to credit data among ACCIS members 
Country 
Is credit data sharing 
required by national 
regulation? 
Do lenders have the 
obligation to consult credit 
reporting databases 
YES NO YES  NO 
Austria   x    x 
Belgium x    x   
Czech Republic    x    x 
Germany   x    x 
Denmark   x    x 
Finland   x    x 
Greece   x*      x 
Croatia   x    x 
Hungary x      x 
Iceland   x    x 
Italy   x    x 
Netherlands x    x   
Norway   x  x   
Poland   x    x 
Romania   x    x 
Serbia x    x   
Russia   x    x 
Sweden   x    x 
Slovenia x      x 
Slovakia   x    x 
Spain   x    x 
Turkey    x    x **   
United Kingdom    x    x 
TOTAL 6  17  5  18 
 
* For bad cheques 
** For the issuance of credit cards  
Source: Association of Consumer Credit Information Suppliers, ACCIS survey 2010 
 
The Mortgage Industry and Consumer Expert Group (“Mortgage Dialogue”) has agreed on 
the formula that “the lender is expected to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer in the 
context of the transaction envisaged” and industry groups assure that loans are not granted if 
under the impression that “the candidate will not be able to meet his repayment obligations.”53 
Over the past years, mortgage lenders have continuously emphasised that proper assessments 
already are an integral part of their business conduct. Yet, insufficient underwriting quality has 
been obvious in some corners, for example a combination of booming housing markets and rising 
values of the underlying (claimable) collateral letting lenders rely on price appreciation rather than 
                                                      
53 Mortgage Industry and Consumer Expert Group (2006). Final Report, page 7. 
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borrower standing, large amounts of risk transferred to third parties via securitisation reducing the 
lender ‘skin in the game’; and generally high competitive pressure.54 
The European Commission has recognised the need to remove existing obstacles that 
potentially hamper lenders’ ability to access reliable sources of information and interpret available 
data on the one side and generate avoidable costs in the lenders’ efforts to carry out the necessary 
creditworthiness assessments on the other. While concerns exist with regard to the accurateness of 
data retrieved from the loan candidate himself (risk of income inflation and incentives to hide 
negative information items), the policy focus lays on access to information gathered and 
distributed by external third-party market players, which ideally assist lenders in the avoidance of 
credit risks under- and overestimation. 
Difficulties in accessing credit in another member state may nowadays seem a relatively 
minor problem. The on-going financial crisis and the general low appetite by consumers for 
financial services products in another EU country have further reduced cross-border activity and 
consumers focus more on local markets, where the perceived risk is lower. In relation to that and 
considering the low demand, private credit registers and public credit bureaux did develop few 
specific infrastructures to provide credit data cross- border. Credit information providers have 
established different systems to exchange data. For instance between the National Bank of Belgium 
and the Dutch credit bureau BKR there is an intensive exchange of data. Yet, it is not significant 
when comparing to the total amount of transaction of consumer credit in each market55. 
Cross border data access is meeting problems related to unfair or discriminatory access 
conditions to credit registers caused by varying membership/client criteria, fee structures and/or 
the need for eligible institutions to have a physical presence in the country of the credit register. 
Data coverage issues have also been an issue as registered information may be incomplete due to 
differences in relation to the national data protection law. Some credit register can collect positive 
and negative information while others, just a couple across Europe, can collect only negative data 
56 Even though, France and Denmark are now evaluating the introduction of the collection of 
positive data, so it will remain only Finland as a negative data country in Europe. 
Where positive information is available it is often restricted to traditional credit from lenders 
and may not include communications or utility data which can also represent large financial 
commitments for consumers. And since the usefulness of available data is derived also from its 
comparability, existing divergences in the amount of data shared on accounts, as well varying 
interpretations of certain terms (e.g. default, delinquencies) and underlying definitions (e.g. non-
performing loan) on the one side and different levels of data collection thresholds on the other side 
create additional shortcomings and problems especially in a cross-border context. Furthermore, 
some states restrict the use of the data so tightly such that it cannot drive the level of benefit that it 
could and, indeed should.  
Table 10 shows, however, that the latter is problematic only in the cross-border comparison 
of a limited amount of countries and not necessarily in the case of mortgage lending. This is a 
result of the low thresholds especially in private credit bureaus (and hence effective almost 
exclusively with respect to small amount consumer credit agreements). 
 
                                                      
54 See, for example, the Commission’s impact assessment accompanying its 2007 “White Paper on the 
I n t e g r a t i o n  o f  E U  M o r t g a g e  C r e d i t  M a r k e t s ” .  D o c u m e n t s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  o n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  w e b p a g e :  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/credit/mortgage_en.htm  
55 See, the EU Report of the Expert Group on Credit Histories, chapter 3.3.2. Private arrangements.  
56 Its in Report on the retail sector inquiry (2007), the European Commission found that some private credit 
registers “may accommodate larger banks by waiving the requirement for full disclosure of data”: 
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Table 10. Threshold for data collection on consumers 
Country and 
credit bureau 
Threshold (in euro) 
Private credit bureaus  Public credit registers 
Austria 300  35,000 
Belgium n.a. No  threshold 
Bulgaria  No threshold  No threshold 
Cyprus No  threshold  n.a. 
Czech Republic  No threshold  No threshold 
Denmark 134  n.a. 
Estonia No  threshold  n.a. 
Finland No  threshold  n.a. 
France n.a.  500 
Germany 100  1,500,000 
Greece No  threshold  n.a. 
Hungary No  threshold  n.a. 
Ireland No  threshold  n.a. 
Italy No  threshold  30,000* 
Latvia No  threshold  150 
Lithuania  No threshold  No threshold 
Luxembourg n.a.  n.a. 
Malta No  threshold  n.a. 
Netherlands 125  n.a. 
Poland No  threshold  n.a. 
Portugal No  threshold  50 
Romania  No threshold  No threshold 
Slovakia  No threshold  No threshold 
Slovenia No  threshold  n.a. 
Spain 60  6,000 
Sweden No  threshold  n.a. 
United 
Kingdom 
No threshold 
n.a. 
 
Notes: Exchange rates as of 05/01/2011; n.a. = not applicable 
* No threshold applied to bad debts 
Source: Association of Consumer Credit Information Suppliers, ACCIS survey 2010 and European Commission (2009). 
Report on the Expert Group on Credit Histories. 
 
Credit Bureaus already play, and will continue to play, an increasingly central role in 
supporting lenders and borrowers to lend and borrow responsibly.  Credit Bureaus stand in 
between lenders and borrowers, as a third party custodian of data in the credit chain, with the 
objective to increase transparency, reduce information asymmetry, increase consistency and, above 
all, support an informed credit transaction for both parties.57 In policy terms, they provide to the 
credit industry the tools for responsible lending, helping to protect individuals from establishing 
significant borrowings beyond their means by ensuring that all parties are aware of the precise 
nature of a borrowers commitments58 or, at a minimum, whether the borrower is in severe 
difficulties.59 The way these tools are deployed, including where scoring value cut-offs are set, is a 
decision for the lender based on the lenders’ appetite for risk and the charges they make. A credit 
                                                      
57 Jappelli Tullio and Marco Pagano, “Information sharing, lending and default: cross-country evidence”, 
CSEF working paper No. 22, University of Salerno, Italy, 1999. 
58 Only possible in countries with full data sharing 
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reporting system does not decide whether an individual qualifies for credit or not. It collects and 
provides information that the credit industry considers relevant to a person's credit history and 
ensures that data is as accurate as possible and collected and deployed in a consistent manner. 
This is endorsed by the Report on the Expert Group on Credit Histories where experts 
clearly stated: “The purpose of credit data sharing is to support creditors analysing a borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Information sharing about borrowers’ characteristics and their indebtedness has 
important effects on credit markets activity. First, it improves the creditors’ knowledge of the 
borrower’s characteristics and permits a more accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities 
if the data is accurate and up-to-date. It therefore assists creditors in complying with responsible 
lending obligations. Second, it helps creditors acquire that information more quickly and often at a 
lower cost. Third, in the case of default data sharing, it can operate as a borrower discipline device. 
Finally, it reduces the risk that borrowers become over-indebted by drawing credit simultaneously 
from too many creditors.”60 
Such benefits can only be achieved in those countries where credit registers can store both 
positive and negative credit data across a wide range of credit types. Without positive data, 
responsible lending and borrowing cannot be fully achieved. For this purpose, the more positive 
information about a borrower that is known, the better the consumer’s commitments and hence, 
creditworthiness can be assessed. At the same time, the consumer can themselves authorise access 
to reliable independent evidence of his creditworthiness, facilitate his financial transaction and 
evaluate his level of indebtedness. With access to a positive and negative credit data report, the 
consumer can clearly demonstrate that he knows how to handle credit and respect his financial 
obligations. Overall, this leads to reduced risk for lenders, lowering costs and therefore interest 
rates. As a result, more consumers are able to be helped and gain access to credit. 
However, credit is only one side of the equation; income is also required in order to conduct 
a reliable assessment of creditworthiness and in many professions the only source for such 
information is the applicant themselves. If checking creditworthiness is set to be the norm then it 
behaves the relevant authorities to support access to reliable income information such as is 
available at the national tax authorities. Thus, just as it is now accepted that expecting the 
applicant to keep good records and provide accurate information about their credit is unrealistic 
so, the same argument must apply to the verification of income, too.  
Credit is also one side of consumer debt. The Commission is aware that a consumers 
indebtedness is made up of credit debts, plus other types of debts, such as utilities bills, telecom 
bills, etc which represent a significant part of the consumers’ debt. While in almost all European 
Countries credit data is available to lenders, alternative debt data is not always available. Where 
alternative data or non-financial services credit data  (e.g. with merchants, utilities providers, 
landlords, etc.) is available, it can add even more value to the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers. This data provides a more comprehensive picture about the commitments and 
indebtedness of the consumer and allow a lender to make a more accurate decision and credit 
assessment. In this respect, there is a very interesting study recently published by the National 
Bank of Belgiumwhich shows that there is a statistically significant link between payment arrears 
for mobile telephony and credit arrears, and this applies for various definitions of payment 
arrears.61 Repayment problems generally tend to emerge sooner in payment arrears for mobile 
telephony bills than in arrears on loans. 
                                                      
60 See paragraph 3.2.2. Purposes of credit data sharing of the Report of the Expert Group on Credit Histories, 
published by the EU the 15 June 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/credit/ 
history_en.htm).  
61 The link between mobile telephony arrears and credit arrears. National Bank of Belgium, March 2011 Link to the 
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The European Commission’s 2010 Working Paper on Responsible Mortgage Lending and 
Borrowing summarises the discussion by asking: Is there a need for a legal requirement on lenders 
to assess a candidate’s financial capability and what can be done to grant access and assist the 
correct interpretation of all available credit data?  
With regard to the first question, the working paper indicates the EU executive’s intention to 
go ahead with the introduction of a legal requirement not only obliging creditors to a “thorough 
assessment of the consumer’s creditworthiness […] in accordance to appropriate processes” but 
also a re-assessment “before any significant increase in the total amount of credit”. To lenders, 
such proposals constitute one of the most worrying aspects of the new initiative in light of the fear 
that an EU-wide prescribed formula will lead to additional costs and – more importantly – replace 
country- and market specific know-how as well as personal knowledge. While it could be argued 
that the introduction of a general legal obligation will not negatively affect banks already engaging 
in responsible lending activities, if – as is the case in the CCD – no prescription of a specific 
methodology is annexed to any such requirement, the usefulness of such an approach has been 
questioned by consumer representatives. The latter support rules on proper (and personalised) 
creditworthiness assessments, which strike the balance between granting only affordable loans on 
the one hand and avoiding financial exclusion on the other. In addition, they emphasise the 
necessity to avoid an over-reliance on automated scoring and negligence of personal face-to-face 
assessments, for the reason of which some consumer groups call for a use of the wording 
‘affordability assessment’ along the lines of the FSA’s proposals on responsible mortgage lending 
in the UK. 62  
In effect, the UK’s financial regulator already requires lenders to take into account a potential 
borrower’s repayment abilities. The FSA underlines that every lending decision has to be made 
individually based on the borrower’s disposable income and calls for a combination of any 
creditworthiness assessment with stress-testing rules regarding interest rate variation. In more 
detail, the FSA proposes to ban self-certification and fast-track mortgage in an effort to ensure that 
income is always verified and expects a line-by-line expenditure assessment to complete the 
affordability test though allowing for some flexibility as the prescribed methods. 
With regard to the second question, the European Commission’s working paper states that 
“in order to facilitate the effective exploitation of credit data, further work might be necessary to 
achieve a convergence of the definitions used in such databases and data processing conditions 
applied in such databases”. In this respect the article 9 of the Consumer Credit Directive should be 
extended to this initiative on mortgage lending and go beyond by taking into consideration the 
principle of reciprocity as recommended by the EGCH at the Recommendation n.6: “The EGCH 
recommends that compliance with the non-discriminatory access to databases requirement in Article 9(1) of 
the Consumer Credit Directive should be considered, in particular, as providing foreign creditors access at 
the same level and terms as local creditors, i.e. with no additional barriers or privileges, and respecting the 
principle of reciprocity, without prejudice to data protection rules, as stated in Article 9(4) of the Consumer 
Credit Directive.” 
A definition of reciprocity should be included in the Glossary of the future Directive. The 
reciprocity rule will ensure that creditors in exchange for obtaining the data from a credit bureau 
are obliged to transfer to the credit bureau the same type and scope of the data they received. Only 
by incentivising membership in this way will coverage be increased. Reciprocity is the base for 
non-discriminatory cross-border access to the data base, too and to guarantee a higher level of data 
quality. 
Consequently, the amount of costs incurred by stakeholders to arrange for the necessary 
infrastructure is limited to an extension of similar access conditions to mortgage credit data (rather 
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than creating new systems from scratch) and, in addition, only to the number of countries that 
have not opted to apply the CCD provisions to mortgage credit. And as those provisions can be 
expected to bring about benefits for credit registers (expansion of business opportunities), lenders 
(increased pool of credit information) and – to a lesser extent – also to consumers, the task of 
finding the necessary support for general non-discriminatory access conditions is limited. 
 
 
 
POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An EU wide legal requirement could improve incentives to more carefully assess borrower affordability. In 
this respect, EU policy-makers should: 
-  introduce a legal requirement for lenders to conduct a comprehensive creditworthiness assessment based 
on stress tests regarding the specific product offered (indirect suitability assessment). Stress tests should 
measure the impact of changes in key environmental variables on the permanent fulfilment of reasonable 
underwriting criteria, given the contract parameters. For example, such tests would include, but not be 
limited to, the impact of changes in interest rates via the interest rate adjustment and amortisation regime 
of the contract on the future debt service-to-income ratio, and the impact of changes in house prices via the 
initial loan-to-value ratio and amortisation regime of the contract on the future loan-to-value ratio; 
-  introduce a legal requirement to deny credit or propose more conservative underwriting in the case of a 
negative result of the affordability assessment. Rules should be specific, e.g. differentiate between 
stretched or predatory lending situation (individual lack of creditworthiness) and the situation of general 
house price inflation (systemic lack of creditworthiness);  
-  encourage the use of more conservative house price valuation standards, e.g. the discounted cash flow 
method using saved rent payments, to reduce reliance in underwriting on observed prices and render 
loan-to-value rules meaningful; 
-  extend CCD provisions of non-discriminatory (cross-border) credit database access for mortgage lenders, 
allowing for full credit data sharing; 
-  explore possibilities to work towards greater convergence of credit registers’ database content; 
-  explore the possibilities to work towards an agreed minimum level of data in credit registers databases; 
-  make available to lenders income and non-financial services credit data help creditors a more 
comprehensive picture about the commitments and indebtedness of the consumer. 
 
3.4  Contractual phase 
3.4.1  Improved early repayment rights and indemnity design 
The term “prepayment option” (or “call option”) describes the borrower’s right to terminate a 
mortgage loan prior to its contractual maturity date. The value of the option depends first on the 
legal regime, i.e. whether a European consumer is granted a universal right to prepay his mortgage 
debt, whether he is given this right under certain circumstances only or whether he is subjected to 
individual contractual specificities agreed upon with the lender depends on the applicable national 
early repayment schemes, whose characteristics vary widely across the EU member states. 
Secondly, if the right to prepay is given, the value of the option depends on the scale of 
prepayment indemnities, which can be fair value (covering cost of the lender incurred through the 
prepayment), or above or below fair value. Thirdly, the value of the prepayment option depends 
on the factors driving exercise behaviour such as (mortgage) interest rate volatility (determining 
the likelihood of the option coming into the money), the duration of the interest rate fixing period, A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 61 
the opportunity costs of the alternative credit offer, and the financial astuteness of the borrower 
determining the optimal exercise point in time.  
Technically, the prepayment option is an American call option on the loan at par (100%, of 
the current exposure). As underwriting a call option generates costs on the supply side, in 
particular reinvestment risk and a truncation of the income stream for the lender from the loan that 
finances loan servicing costs and profit margin, a borrower choosing a contract with a prepayment 
option not restricted by indemnities will pay a mark-up over the lending rate, the option premium. 
Such a contract is called ‘callable’ in the financial industry. 
In contrast, the more typical fixed-rate lending contract in Europe reduces or eliminates the 
value of the call option via prepayment indemnities, often in combination with additional legal 
transactions costs (e.g. re-registration of the mortgage). These cost factors constitute an exit pricing 
mechanism that massively reduces both prepayments and lender cost of a prepayment and in 
consequence leads to saving the interest rate mark-up, or lower loan cost. The most radical version 
is to exclude the prepayment option contractually, which in practice could mean a rejection and 
high opportunity cost for the borrower. In practice, lenders will eventually accept a prepayment, 
but negotiate an arbitrary exit price.  
We can therefore divide the mortgage product world into three main loan product classes 
according to their interest rate characteristics: 
-  Non-callable fixed rate mortgages (FRM), with the term ‘non-callable’ as discussed 
referring to lenders being able to charge a prepayment indemnity and not necessarily legal 
exclusion. Non-callable FRM generate a stable and easily predictable stream of income for lenders, 
just as owning a government bond does. While offering protection against interest rate increases, 
long remaining fixed-rate terms that are locked in via indemnities may be costly for the borrowers 
if market rates have declined and meanwhile income growth has slowed (e.g. because of declining 
inflation, as in the 1990s, or an economic crisis, as currently). Non-callables are typically funded by 
the issuance of bank bonds that are close substitutes to government bonds on capital markets. 
Non-callables can be easily priced off the government bond curve. 
- Callable fixed rate mortgages (FRM) allow a prepayment without an indemnity. They offer 
borrowers the highest interest rate risk protection via an asymmetry: interest rates are fixed and 
thus eliminate payment shock risk; however, consumers can fully benefit from interest rate 
compression through a prepayment without cost. Yet, there is no free lunch. The cost of this 
potential benefit is paid by the borrower in form of a call (or prepayment) option premium. For 
lenders the product also means considerable uncertainty about the income stream derived from 
the loan, which leads to greater upfront pricing through disagio or points, or even larger margins. 
-  Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), finally, are typically callable without or only small 
indemnities. While lenders are protected against interest rate risk, rate increases may create 
significant payment shock or a reduced payment for borrowers. ARMs are funded by short-term 
deposits of banks and characterised by periodical interest rate resets.  
Currently basically all mortgage markets in Europe empirically apply some form of 
prepayment protection to fixed-rate mortgages. Where this is not (entirely) possible in the form of 
indemnities due to tight legal caps, legal cost of prepayment are typically high creating an 
additional break against a prepayment (e.g. France, Belgium). Italy is the only country that has 
completely outlawed prepayment fees and thus forces lenders to offer only callable FRM. 
Denmark is a special case, where the purchase of callable FRM by institutional investors has a long 
historical tradition and that market has existed without legal intervention.  
The existing diversity in the legal regimes of indemnities effectively pre-empts the cross-
border trading in particular of non-callable FRM, and has contributed to the strong market share of 
ARM in Europe. A high ARM market share is a stability threat, as clearly demonstrated by current 
events. Spain has reacted to this and re-regulated the non-callable FRM prepayment indemnity 
regime in 2007 in order to incentivise more bank offers of this product, after ARM interest rates 62 | SELECTED MORTGAGE CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES DISCUSSED BY THE TASK FORCE 
had more than doubled in 2006. Both excessive cost and the inability to prepay in some 
jurisdictions may hamper financial consumer mobility. These factors have led the European 
Commission to conclude that early repayment is “one of the most important issues for integrating 
EU mortgage markets”.63 The document consequently promised to explore possible policy options 
and assess related costs and benefits.  
The study “on the costs and benefits of different policy options for mortgage credit” that was 
commissioned to European mortgage market experts and covers the area remains unpublished. 
The European Commission’s 2010 Working Paper on Responsible Mortgage Lending and 
Borrowing as well as the forthcoming Directive had indicated no intention to forward regulation 
However, there are indications as of early 2011 that this view has changed. 
Regardless of law-making tactics, the before mentioned cross-border and stability issues 
suggest that a measured regulatory response in the area is justified. The fundamental questions on 
the table are:  
•  Early repayment rights: Should borrowers be granted a universal prepayment option or 
should the lender have the right to contractually exclude it? 
•  Early repayment indemnities: Should lenders be entitled to charge prepayment indemnities?  
•  Early repayment indemnities formula and limits: Should ex-ante determined indemnities 
remain allowed, or should indemnities follow the fair value principle? Should regulators 
introduce limits to the fair value principle? 
The reason for addressing the first issue is be the existence of legal regimes lacking 
provisions on – or specifically allowing – the contractual exclusion of loan prepayments, which 
may lead to considerable reductions in consumer utility, e.g. borrowers having to seek the lender’s 
agreement to prepay and possibly being forced to pay an arbitrary exit price from the contract. Full 
contractual freedom to exclude a prepayment is no longer characteristic for European countries, 
outside Eastern Europe with recently emerging legislation. Even in the prominent German case, 
where exclusion is still possible, this lender option has been constrained by a Federal Civil Court 
(‘Bundesgerichtshof’) order for the important case of a consumer moving house. The Court in the 
judgment from the mid-1990s argued that the consumer’s interest in financial mobility should be 
respected by the lender.  
Moving to the analysis of the second and third question, it is essential understand the pricing 
mechanics and related market value of non-callable vs. callable FRM.  
Figure 13 demonstrates in a simplified form the pricing behaviour of pools of ARMs as well 
as callable and non-callable FRMs in response to changing market interest rates. The value of a 
pool of adjustable rate mortgage loans remains broadly constant (priced around par) as their 
interest rate is tied to current market rates. In contrast, the value of a pool of fixed rate mortgage 
loan products responds to interest rate cycles and its price, in principle, is determined like the price 
of a fixed-rate government bond: if interest rates fall (rise) versus the actual contract rate 
(‘coupon’), the value of a lender’s fixed-rate mortgage pool increases (decreases).  
This government bond-style pricing works only, however, in the case of non-callable FRM. If 
call protection is prohibited or curtailed by the national legal regime, fixed-rate mortgage pools 
price like non-callable FRMs in the event of rising interest rates (as only few borrowers in the loan 
pool with prepayment option will exercise their option) but similar to ARMs in a scenario of 
declining interest rates. They become hybrid assets, which are complex to value for 
investors/lenders. The fact that these loans (callable FRMs) can be prepaid at par (100%) lowers 
the value of the mortgage pool as interest rate drop, because the prepayment option ‘comes into 
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profits under different compensation schemes. The slope of a line indicates the price risk of 
lenders/investors according to changing market rates (‘duration’): the longer the fixed-rate period, 
the greater is the change of the value of the mortgage pool for investors or lenders in reaction to a 
change in interest rates. 
 
Figure 14. Conceptual framework for the pricing of non-callable FRM 
 
 
 
Source: Finpolconsult,, from Dübel, Duke and Muller (2009). 
 
In the past, lawmakers and courts in Europe have tried to call the debate on the optimal 
compensation scheme on the national levels, which resulted in the creation of a ‘Swiss cheese’ of 
regulations. Diversity can be partly explained by the vastly diverging national inflation histories of 
the 1970s that created different risk of the kind just described for borrowers. France, for example, 
introduced her tight prepayment caps at the height of inflation, in 1978, fearing that consumers 
would be locked in for a long time into high interest rates and would subsequently default. Also, 
differing attitudes of lenders play a role: both France and Italy had anti-trust cases against lenders 
colluding to refuse to accept prepayments. In Germany, resistance by lenders against offering the 
prepayment option is officially motivated by the intent to protect the covered bond (‘Pfandbrief’), 
even though the bond is only modestly used for retail mortgage finance. A more important aspect 
could be the low legal transaction costs via the use of fiduciary liens dominating in the German 
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mortgage market that drive down the exercise cost of the prepayment option and could jeopardise 
already low margins. 
Generally, Europe can be divided into two schools with regard to indemnity design for non-
callable FRMs: 
- ‘Pragmatists’ support ex-ante fixed indemnities, arguing that clear and understandable 
statutory maximum volume limits are desirable from a consumer perspective. France and Belgium 
are examples of two jurisdictions which impose tight volume limits (cap or fee) on indemnities, 
and de-facto allow lenders to charge a fixed prepayment fee in all rate scenarios. Though reducing 
the incurred reinvestment loss, this approach does not close the gap to ‘fair value compensation’ as 
can be seen in Figure 14 for market rates below the FRM coupon rate, the loss of lender revenue is 
indicated as the difference between the red line (3% volume limit on prepayment compensation, 
the case of France) and the horizontal blue line (‘fair value compensation’). Rising market rates, 
however, deliver a reinvestment profit to the lenders, which – again – is a departure from the fair 
value compensation principle, and the ex-ante fixed indemnity adds to this profit. Such a 
formulation of an indemnity volume limit is hence simple, but by definition always mismatches 
with lender profit and loss. Note that the outlawing of indemnities in Italy since 2007 (equal to a 
capping of the volume limit at 0%) does not pre-empt lenders from making a profit in a scenario of 
prepaying borrowers in times of rising interest rates (magenta line). 
- The ‘fair-value compensation’ school, mostly based in Northern Europe, on the other hand 
suggests a calibration of indemnities according to actual reinvestment profit and loss incurred by 
the lender (as well as in some cases loss from truncation of the income stream of the lender). This 
implies the use of a mathematical formula which – in the Danish ‘symmetric’ compensation model 
– eliminates both losses (profits) in the case of falling (rising) interest rates (see horizontal then 
dotted blue line in Figure 14). In the predominant class of jurisdictions with ‘asymmetric’ models, 
in particular including Germany, however, lender losses from prepayments into falling interest 
rates are compensated for while lenders can make a profit from reinvesting prepayment proceeds 
during rising interest rates. Borrowers prepaying when market rates are above the coupon do not 
participate in the reinvestment gain of the lender (blue line in Figure 14). The scenario is 
empirically less relevant, as few borrowers prepay when interest rates have risen.  
The volume of compensations payable under the fair value compensation model can be 
implicitly constrained. One option is imposing a time limit on the residual interest rate fixing 
period permissible for the calculation. This is the legal situation in Germany, where an indemnity 
can be only charged for a maximum of 10 years, or the residual interest-rate fixing time until 10 
years are reached, whichever is lower. A 15 or 20 year FRM loan in Germany hence carries an 
indemnity only for a maximum of 10 years. If that loan is prepaid after 4 years, the yield 
maintenance formula applies only to the residual period, i.e. 6 years. This limits the maximum 
penalty payable indirectly. 
However, since a yield maintenance formula might lead to high indemnities in drastic 
circumstances, e.g. a very strong rate decline as seen in the 1990s, it could be combined with a 
sufficiently high volume limit. A simple formulation could combine the limits of 10 years and 10% 
of the outstanding loan volume. This would cut higher indemnities seen e.g. in the German market 
in the 1990s, and thus lead, under extreme interest rate scenarios to lender loss. It needs to be 
emphasised in that regard that average indemnities on 10 year loans under the far less volatile 
European fixed-rate interest rate trends in the past decade have been far lower than the levels seen 
in the 1990s, in the range of 0 to 5%.  
The mitigation of reinvestment risk for lenders under the non-callable FRM has enabled very 
low spreads over government-bonds; for example German FRM rates are among the lowest in 
Europe and systematically lower than Danish FRM rates, where the callable FRM product entails 
the mark-up for the prepayment option costs. Ideally, both products should be offered jointly and 
in a clean pricing structure: either under a spread mark-up for the prepayment option cost and no 66 | SELECTED MORTGAGE CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES DISCUSSED BY THE TASK FORCE 
indemnity, or an indemnity and no or only minimal prepayment option cost spread mark-up. A 
harmonisation of indemnities could facilitate moving towards that market structure. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The prepayment option is important to safeguard financial and physical mobility of European 
consumers. Regulating the area might improve the outlook for a renaissance of the European fixed-rate 
mortgage (FRM) market.  
-  The consumer should have the early repayment right; rejecting a prepayment or charging arbitrary 
prices under negotiated prepayments seriously reduces consumer mobility; 
-  Lenders should be able to recover their cost in case of an early repayment. Prepayment indemnities 
should be harmonised along the lines of the fair value approach, ideally on the basis of symmetric 
yield maintenance computations which are based on standardised benchmarks (‘marketing-to-
market model of prepayment charges’). Harmonising indemnities is central to positively delimit the 
‘non-callable’ FRM product, which dominates the FRM market in Europe (a ‘callable’ FRM would 
be one in which no indemnity is charged); 
-  The CCD approach of tight statutory ceiling on indemnities is not transferable to long-term 
mortgage lending. Tight caps leads to dual pricing structure of the prepayment option as a spread 
mark-up and a residual indemnity. Contracts should be clearly structured into either containing a 
spread mark-up or an indemnity, which requires a degree of flexibility for the latter as described; 
-  In order to counter a potential credit risk increase, a combination of broad volume and time ceilings 
(residual interest-rate fixing period) could limit a yield maintenance indemnity computation 
formula. Examples for simple ceilings would be 10 years and 10% of the outstanding loan amount, 
or 5 years and 5%; 
-  The transparency of the indemnity component related to the loss of the lender administration, 
credit risk and profit (‘servicing’) income stream from a prepayment should be enhanced. Either 
this component should match the actual cost incurred by the lender, or a simple lump-sum volume 
formulation should be used (e.g. 1% or 0.5%). 
 
3.4.2  Rate adjustments and caps 
This final section regarding specific consumer protection rules will deal with a core material topic 
that has been largely left out of the European mortgage consumer protection debate in recent 
years: unilateral rate adjustments. The neglect of the area comes despite the fact that mortgage 
contracts carrying adjustable interest rates are by far the largest product class in Europe and carry 
significant credit and systemic risk. 
The main regulatory questions in the consumer protection area are the following: 
-  Should interest rates be required to be adjusted based on use of an agreed index or reference 
rate only?  
-  Should interest rates on ARMs be statutorily capped or heightened transparency / risk 
warnings be favoured?  
There are wider bank regulatory questions, such as capital requirements, which will not be 
addressed here. 
The CCD of 1998 had answered the first question in the affirmative and had required an 
objective reference rate that could not be altered by either contract party. This approach followed 
in particular Southern European traditions to require and define official indices, e.g. Spain or 
France, governing adjustment. Spain, as discussed in Chapter 1, had created a menu of ARM 
indices in 1994 to structure the product set in the mortgage market.  A NEW MORTGAGE CREDIT REGIME FOR EUROPE | 67 
The greatest opposition to the old CCD approach came from the countries applying products 
where the interest rate remains unilaterally reviewable by the lender, most prominently Britain 
with its dominant ‘Standard Variable Rate’ (SVR) product. Germany and other countries, of which 
many in the 1990s still rarely used ARMs, found themselves in a mezzanine position as court 
judgments had increasingly cut back lender options to use discretion upon a rate review (which 
often had delayed downward adjustment). 
In the meantime, the relevance of ARM in the EU has ballooned. In the new CCD the issue of 
regulating adjustment has been dropped in favour of greater transparency, spelled out in Article 
11. The intention of Article 11 clearly is to buy the consumer time to facilitate a prepayment before 
an adjustment, rather than defining the options for the lender.  
Contrasting with this very laid back approach, the scope of regulating the area, and in 
particular finding a solution suitable for mortgages, has increased, rather than diminished. First, 
mortgage prepayments tend to be less feasible in a financial crisis, as the declining prepayment 
shares in new mortgage originations across Europe in the past years show. This exposes the 
borrower to lender re-pricing discretion exactly at the time when he is most vulnerable to it, e.g. to 
potential loss of employment during a crisis.  
Secondly, together with the increasing relevance of the product, an ever increasing number 
of court cases and regulations have further scattered the regulation playing field, making a sale of 
a specific ARM product across borders a virtual impossibility. For example, reviewable rate 
products are banned in countries demanding the use of an index, e.g. the standard British product 
is banned in Spain. Also permissible indices and adjustment periods differ between countries 
demanding indexation.  
Thirdly, the financial crisis has added a new dimension to the debate, as witnessed by a 
number of empirical observations: 
•  The importance of (central bank) interest rate pass-through in order to stem a possible 
default wave has dramatically increased due to the scale of house price cycles and the 
resulting level of indebtedness. The Bank of Spain reported in early 2010 that a whole third 
of Spanish mortgage loans carried interest rate floors that pre-empted a sufficient downward 
adjustment during the crisis. Such loans are currently in some cases getting prepaid and 
refinanced into unconstrained Euribor ARM, as banks faced consumer protest and/or 
became aware of the increased default risk brought about by the rate floor. Anecdotal 
information suggests that by early 2011 the Cajas, which tend to be confronted with higher 
potential credit risk in their portfolios, are more proactive in removing floor clauses than 
private banks.  
•  However, the crisis has also put the spot on the downward rate review issue in unilaterally 
reviewable rate contracts, which in the 1990s already had been an issue in many jurisdictions 
and triggered court intervention. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the Hungarian mortgage 
market, foreign currency mortgages denominated in Swiss Franc typically carry interest rates 
that lenders do unilaterally review, while in the Polish market Swiss Franc rates are tied to 
Swiss interbank indices. When the combined banking and devaluation crisis hit both 
economies, Hungarian lenders decided to pass-through their increased funding cost and 
created a double shock for borrowers – a devaluation increasing instalments via the 
exchange rate effect, and an increase in the interest rate. Polish borrowers, in contrast were 
hedged as the decline in Swiss interbank rates compensated for the exchange rate effect. 
Polish banks took a temporary loss as their funding cost exceeded Swiss interbank rates. 
Mortgage default rates in Poland were considerably lower than in Hungary. 
•  Such examples noted, it is at the same time increasingly clear that the surge in index-tracking 
ARM, which do avoid the downward review issue, in the run-up to the crisis in a number of 
countries was leading to heavy under-pricing of mortgages and contributed to house price 
inflation in the periphery – from Spain to Ireland. In the British case, as Figure 15 shows, 
index tracker mortgages in 2007 for months were sold at de-facto zero mark-up over Libor, 68 | SELECTE
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over the initial rate is typically 2%. Lenders take the downside risk under this formulation, instead 
of borrowers, who in exchange pay a higher spread to lenders.  
These findings present policymakers with a dilemma. On the one hand can unilateral rate 
adjustment options in the hands of lenders directly lead to great affordability pressure on 
borrowers and higher defaults, on the other hand can the enforcement of indexation in mortgage 
contracts lead to extremely volatile pricing conditions and stimulate house price inflation. 
Secondly, caps protecting against payment shock are exactly used in those member states where 
they are least needed, and remainder exposes borrowers to severe payment shock risk. The 
feedback effect linking both is that if meaningful caps are not used and hence priced into the rate, 
as in France, rates become even lower and push house prices and risk up even further. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, fixed-rate mortgage lending largely (depending on the length 
of the fixing period) avoids these problems. However, it seems politically inconceivable to do 
regulation in Europe discouraging ARM products in their entirety, given their dominance in the 
market. Obviously, finally, the historic preference for tracker mortgages taken by the old CCD 
seems to have lost appeal.  
The challenge going forward is therefore to structure both products in a way that minimises 
their risk. There are a number of options to be explored: 
-  Rate adjustment could be linked to an objective reference rate, as under the old CCD, while 
demanding caps. This would lead to a re-pricing of ARM via higher spreads. Extreme 
situations of zero spread as in the UK market during 2007 would be less likely (even if of 
course not excluded). ARM and FRM interest rates would converge, as ARM borrowers pay 
the cap premium to lenders / investors.  
Borrowers would be protected against catastrophic downside risk (interest rate shock), while 
remaining exposed to some interest rate risk. This is essentially the French ARM model. If 
moreover, an agreement on the classes of permissible reference rates could be made on the 
European level, there would be the potential for a cross-border market in ARM. 
-  Caps could be made a generalised requirement for both reviewable rate and index tracker 
mortgages, leaving the discussion about the use of reference rates to subsidiarity, i.e. to the 
courts. Caps could be defined – in this and the former option - at meaningfully tight distance 
to current rates, e.g. 2-3% in absolute terms, or a ratio relative to current rates).  
This would at least protect borrowers domestically against interest rate shock, and by 
implication protect central banks against being held hostage by the mortgage market when 
inflation starts to pick up. The downside would be a less integrated European markets, as 
reference rate use is not universal and its selection remains a national item. 
-  Thirdly, the CCD could be transposed in its current form, essentially limiting ARM 
regulations to enhanced disclosure of a forthcoming rate adjustment, giving time for 
prepayments. This essentially leaves the status quo intact, since prepayments – the only 
relevant potential reaction of borrowers to stem a rising payment – are infeasible during 
crisis. 
There are obviously other mathematical combinations, which seem to make less sense, 
however. Demanding caps, for example, without specifying some maximum distance to current 
rates, renders them meaningless, as the Spanish case shows. Regulating rate adjustment only 
without defining a cap, the old CCD approach, may create more risk as the British index tracker 
example demonstrates. In fact, borrowers could prepay easily into less secure forms of credit as the 
result of mis-designed regulations.  
If confronted with the alternative, the requirement of meaningful caps, i.e. a narrowing of the 
cost of credit between ARM and FRM, should be the priority over managing the rate adjustment. 
Floors seem to have been a problem related to forcing lenders to use an official reference rate. Such 
practices could be outlawed without loss of product diversity. In a reviewable-rate system, the 
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index-based system, banks should be hedged by attracting funds under the same index. If they 
cannot manage the index risk, they should be allowed to do reviewable rate contracting. 
 
3.4.3  Dealing with more far-reaching consumer protection issues, the role of Commission 
vs. member states 
We have so far discussed policy options and recommendations regarding a limited canon of 
consumer protection issues. This list has been an amalgam of the issues proposed by the European 
Commission’s White Paper as crisis response (advice, responsible lending), the historical agenda of 
transposing at least the transparency sections of the CCD (pre-contractual information, APRC), to 
mortgage lending, and of product regulation issues discussed in Chapter 1 (early 
repayment/fixed-rate lending, rate adjustment/variable-rate lending). 
The focus on items beyond transparency, e.g. responsible lending, has been criticised as a 
departure from the traditional approach of focusing on the internal market and cross border 
lending. Yet, next to structural, legal, behavioural and cultural barriers, material consumer 
protection issues in mortgages are also impediments to the cross-border market and fall under the 
EU’s mandate as the competition watchdog.  
POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The European mortgage market is dominated by adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM). These have 
exhibited considerable payment shock risk for consumers before and during the financial crisis. Yet, 
only scant regulatory initiatives have been made at EU level for this product. Given the high 
importance for consumer protection, bank solvency, competition and monetary policy, the issue 
should be addressed. 
-  The approach taken by the CCD to create heightened transparency of an upcoming rate 
adjustment will not have major consumer protection effects in ARM lending. During crisis the 
options for consumers to avoid an increase by prepaying a long-term loan typically dramatically 
diminish, and in particular so for those consumers most vulnerable to the rate increase.  
-  ARM lending in the EU – whether in the form of reviewable rate or index-tracker mortgages - 
should be brought to a minimum standard regarding large downside interest rate rate risk 
protection for the consumer. When lenders offer such protection, against a rate mark-up paid by 
consumers, this significantly improves the risk profile of mortgage borrowing. Markets 
penetrate less down the credit curve, house price cycles are mitigated as the discount factor for 
pricing the saved rent stream derived from ownership remains higher, and the political pressure 
on central banks to reduce interest rates in order to avoid increasing defaults, in particular 
during crisis, is reduced.  
-  Limiting downsize risk implies the use of sufficiently tight and long-term interest rate caps (e.g., 
x+2%, or 150%*x, over at least the first 5 years of the loan, with x being the initial rate). An 
alternative to interest rate caps are payment caps, or in the case of foreign currency lending caps 
on a maximum permissible exchange rate (possibly combined with interest rate caps). . The 
impact will be a narrowing of the cost difference between ARM and FRM; however, this does 
not mean a full equalization, since the borrower still takes a determined, yet limited amount of 
interest rate risk. Interest rate caps can be shorter, the faster loans amortize, which reduces the 
payment shock risk.  
-  Given detrimental experiences during the financial crisis in both products – reviewable and 
tracker (reference index-linked) - in the EU, the case for mandating the use of reference indices 
to govern the ARM product seems weak. This speaks in favour of accepting both types of 
product EU-wide, provided safeguards regarding sufficiently reactive adjustment of reviewable-
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Moreover, financial stability issues in one jurisdiction resulting from a lack or excess of 
consumer protection generate problems within the credit markets of the entire Union. While 
stability issues do not fall into a formal mandate as defined in the Treaty, they impair a number of 
defined functions of the EU, for example regarding competition and state aid to banks. 
Clearly, national legislations and even the CCD go beyond the list of issues discussed and 
cover issues of sometimes at least or even greater relevance to the cross-border market and 
stability:  
-  First, our list addresses only transparency and underwriting and thus not the pivotal 
endgame of the credit relationship: execution via repossession or foreclosure, or at the near-
execution stage options for household debt management. Member state laws also vary vastly 
in the post-execution/consumer insolvency area, from lifetime residual debt (Spain) to swift 
discharge (UK). These differences have massive implications for bank solvency/resolution 
policies, other fiscal policies, and monetary policies. 
-  Secondly, important issues in underwriting and during the loan life are not addressed. 
Prominent is the issue of loan assignment, which has become more tightly regulated together 
with the emerging market for non-performing loan portfolios often involving US investors in 
the 2000s (e.g., in Germany). Another high-profile issue, especially for periphery countries 
with construction boom and bust, that has been left out are linked credit agreements. This 
concept addresses the conflict of interest presented by a lender closely interacting with 
producers of goods to be financed. An example would be an apartment building where both 
sales and financing contracts are closely linked. A CCD transposition would imply that a 
deficient consumer-developer sales contract (e.g. due to construction deficiencies) could, 
under certain circumstances, impair the entitlement of the lender to full repayment under the 
loan contract. 
These and other issues that arise as market products and practices develop have great 
relevance. Still it is either politically unrealistic or excessively complex, or both, to attempt a 
maximum harmonisation for the entire area of consumer lending and of all relevant additional 
issues. Yet, mutual recognition of national legislation, the option at the other extreme of maximum 
harmonisation, may seriously impair the above goals. Minimum harmonisation represents the 
status quo of a national regulation patchwork, unless additional national regulation options 
become more limited. 
This raises the question regarding a more defensive strategy conducive to protect minimum 
goals and in particular the internal market (cross-border lending). One defensive approach would 
be to create an interactive law-making process between member states and the EU, i.e. between the 
consumer protection lawmaker of first resort and the competition authority.  
The model that could be followed here is state aid, considered by many as the grand success 
story of the EU. State aid is generally permissible in well-defined and limited cases and requires a 
decision of the European Commission in a majority of cases. The onus is on the member state to 
motivate whether conditions are met, for example a state aid to a bank is indispensable in order to 
fend off stability risks. 
The approach could be transferred to the area of protection of consumers in consumer 
lending in the following way. The EU would: 
-  define a methodology to estimate the risk exposures of consumers that purchase certain 
products and are exposed to certain practices, 
-  set wide minimum material consumer protection rules under the maximum harmonisation 
approach and regularly (e.g. every 10 years) review the rules empirically, 
-  allow member states experiencing new products and practices sold across borders to 
temporarily require from lenders heightened disclosure which could serve as a “warning 
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-  create an appeals process for the member states aiming to keep or introduce stricter national 
material consumer protection rules, effectively barring those new products and practices, 
based on the above-mentioned methodology.  
The member states would:  
-  either accept the maximum harmonisation level (i.e. eliminate more restrictive consumer 
protection legislation), 
-  or appeal to the European Commission for setting stricter rules subject to review on more 
frequent basis, e.g. every 3-5 years, by providing empirical evidence within the provided 
methodological framework. 
Consider again the example of loan assignment. National legislation exists that ties a loan 
assignment to another creditor to maintaining the initial loan servicer. Such legislation de-facto 
pre-empts the transfer of loan servicing for the life of the loan and seriously impairs the options for 
loan portfolio buyers and sellers, thereby depressing loan portfolio prices. It sacrifices both the 
loan transfer and the loan servicing markets across borders in Europe, indeed, it has been passed 
in order to block foreign lenders with possibly swifter execution preferences from the national 
market.  
Yet, national legislation in this area has also had a fairly solid core of consumer protection 
purpose. It is protecting borrowers in a non-performing or near-non-performing (‘sub-
performing’) situation from becoming subjected to more aggressive execution. A more 
fundamental point has been that consumers select contract counterparties according to their 
execution preferences. As in the case of rate adjustment, simply prepaying a loan when the lender 
changes may not be an option, especially for more vulnerable consumers. 
The process proposed here would ultimately gauge the validity of the competition 
arguments against the consumer protection (stability) arguments. It would force the member state 
to sunset the more far-reaching legislation on loan assignment and submit it to the empirical test. 
This test would include studying whether there have been or could be expected significant 
differences to the detriment of consumers in loan execution between initial servicers (upon 
underwriting) and third-party servicers. Alternatively, a modified formulation of the legislation 
could be passed that serves the same intended purpose of minimising differences in execution 
practices, with less restrictive means from a competition perspective. 
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POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current policy approach of the European Commission with regard to retail lending focuses 
largely on recommendations regarding responsible lending. This has been criticised as a departure 
from the traditional approach of focusing on the internal market and cross-border lending. Yet, next 
to structural barriers, material consumer protection issues in mortgage credit are also impediments 
to an integrated market and fall under the EU’s mandate as competition watchdog. Moreover, 
financial stability issues in one jurisdiction resulting from a lack or excess of consumer protection 
generate problems within the credit markets of the entire Union. While stability issues are not a 
formal EU mandate as defined in the Treaty, they clearly impair a number of functions of the EU.  
Developing products and practices in consumer lending markets as well as long delays of stakeholder 
discussion ensure that a comprehensive (maximum harmonization) regulation approach at the EU level 
does always too little too late. Mutual recognition of more far-reaching consumer protection at the national 
level, as well as minimum harmonization leaving out many relevant issues as currently the case, in 
contrast, preserve the patchwork of legislation seriously impairing the cross-border market as well as 
stability.  
A more defensive approach is proposed that structures an interaction process between member state and 
EU regarding more far reaching consumer protection regulation along the lines of the mechanisms laid 
down for state aid.  
 
The core of the proposal is to enable the EU to define a methodology to estimate the risk exposures of 
consumers that purchase certain products and are exposed to certain practices and create an appeals 
process for the member states aiming to keep or introduce stricter national material consumer protection 
rules. The member states would in particular be subjected to review their idiosyncratic rules on a frequent 
basis and on this occasion bear the onus of providing empirical evidence within the defined 
methodological framework.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AHE Associacion  Hipotecaria  Espanola 
APRC  Annual Percentage Rate of Charge 
ARM Adjustable-Rate  Mortgage 
CCD  Consumer Credit Directive 
CHF Swiss  Franc 
CDO  Collateralised Debt Obligation 
CLTV  Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 
CML  Council of Mortgage Lenders 
EBIC  European Banking Industry Committee 
EGCH  Expert Group on Credit Histories 
ESIS  European Standard Information Sheet 
EU European  Union 
EUR Euro  (currency) 
FDIC  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FHA  Federal Housing Administration (US) 
FHFA  Federal Housing Finance Agency (US) 
FHLB  Federal Home Loan Banks (US) 
FRM  Fixed-Rate Mortgage (in Europe, includes fixed-to-term) 
FSA  Financial Services Administration (UK) 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GECMC  Government Expert Group on Mortgage Credit 
GSE Government-Sponsored  Enterprises 
HAMP   Loan modification programme 
HARP  Loan prepayment programme 
HUD  Housing and Urban Development Department (US) 
KFI   Key Facts Information 
LTV Loan-to-Value  Ratio 
MBS Mortgage-Backed  Securities   
MFEG  Mortgage Funding Expert Group 
MICEG  Mortgage Industry and Consumer Dialogue Expert Group 
S&Ls  Savings and Loans 
SVR  Standard Variable Rate 
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